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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN L. ARMSTRONG and GLENDA A. 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FAR~V~ERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unkown; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV- 03 qd/Y 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A 1. 
Fee: $77.00 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendants, Brian L. Armstrong and Glenda A. 
Armstrong, husband and wife, by and through their attorney of record, Douglas S. Marfice, of 
Ramsden & Lyons, and for a cause of action, state and allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs, Brian L. and Glenda A. Armstrong (herein "Armstrongs") are, and at 
all times relevant to this action, were residents of Kootenai County, State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers") is, and at all times 
OI '.: 
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relevant to this action was, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Idaho with its principal place of business is located in the City of Pocatello, Bannock 
County, State of Idaho. Farmers now is, and at all times material hereto was, conducting the 
business of insurance within the State of Idaho. 
3. Corporate Does I through X are corporate entities where true names are 
unknown. Corporate Does I through X are believed to be corporate entities that breached 
certain duties to the Plaintiffs and thereby caused the Plaintiffs to suffer damages in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
4. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to LC. 3 5-514 and venue is proper pursuant to 
LC. 3 4-404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. The Armstrongs are owners of real property commonly located at 3259 N. 14 '~ 
Street, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 
6. The Armstrongs purchased Protector Plus homeowner's insurance policy 
number 91828-03-27 from Farmers to insure their home located at 3529 N. 14th Street. 
Farmers policy 91828-03-27 had a stated policy period from March 24, 2003 to March 23, 
2004. 
7. At all times material hereto, the Armstrongs were the insureds of Farmers. As 
insureds of Farmers, a specla1 relationship of insurer and insured existed between Farmers and 
the Armstrongs. 
8. Sometime prior to July 2, 2003, the Armstrongs contacted Farmers' general 
agent, David Nipp and informed him that they were purchasing an above-ground swimming 
pool. Nipp assured the Armshongs that the installation of the swirnming pool was covered 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 002 
under their Farmers policy. Based on agent Nipp's representations, the Armstrongs reasonably 
believed the swimming pool was covered under their Farmers homeowner's policy. 
9. On July 2,2003, the Armstrongs' home was damaged when the swimming pool 
unexpectedly collapsed and caused water to suddenly flood into their home. Immediately 
thereafter, the Armstrongs contacted agent Nipp to report that the swimming pool had collapsed 
causing water to flood into and damage their home. Nipp explained he would report the same 
to Farmers. 
10. Sometime thereafter, agent Nipp contacted the Armstrongs and informed them 
that he had been informed by Farmers that the collapse of the swimming pool and the resulting 
damage to their home was not covered under their homeowner's policy. Nipp explained to the 
h s t r o n g s  that Farmers would deny any claim the Armstrong's made under their 
homeowner's policy for the damage caused by the collapse of the swimming pool. 
11. By letter dated September 17, 2003, Farmers' agent or employee, Joel Bunis, 
wrote the Armstrongs stating "[iJn light of the above, Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully 
declines coverage for the water damages to your home." By this letter, Farmers claimed that 
the Armstrongs' reported loss was not covered under their Farmers homeowner's policy. 
12. By letter dated September 26, 2003, the Armstrongs responded to Farmers' 
agentlemployee, Joel Bums, and explained their disagreement with Farmers' denial of 
coverage. The h s t r o n g s  informed Bums that "[wle advised our Farmers agent of the fact 
that we had installed an above-gromd pool and were assured that we had adequate coverage. 
Neither our agent nor the company ever informed us that we would not be covered if the pool 
collapsed and damaged our home." The Armstrongs requested the appropriate form in which 
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to submit a signed statement (Proof of Loss) as required by their policy ("Your Duties After 
Loss) and asked that Farmers reconsider its prior denial of claim. 
13. By letter dated October 2,2003, Farmers through its employeelagent Joel Bums, 
responded to the Armstrongs and again informed them that Farmers was denying coverage 
under their homeowner's policy. Farmers expressly rejected the Arrnstrongs' request for proof 
of loss forms in violation of Idaho law. 
14. Despite Farmers' written denial of their claim, on October 24, 2003, the 
Armstrongs prepared and submitted a sworn statement in Proof of Loss to comply with 5 41- 
1839, Idaho Code, and the policy. 
15. By letter dated November 14, 2003, Farmers through its employeelagent, Joel 
Bums, acknowledged receipt and review of the Armstrongs' Proof of Loss dated October 14, 
2003. Burns informed the Armstrongs that Fanners was not changing its earlier position and 
that Farmers was still denying the Armstrongs claim. 
16. At all times material hereto, the Armstrongs have fulfilled all the terms of their 
homeowner's policy in that all policy premiums were paid and current and that more than thirty 
(30) days have elapsed since the receipt by Fanners of satisfactory Proof of Loss, in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the policy and Idaho law. 
COUNT ONE 
BREACHOFCONTRACT 
17. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations in paragraphs 1-16 as though l l l y  set forth 
herein. 
18. Farmers' failure to take action or otherwise pay against all direct loss and 
damage to the Armstrongs' home is a breach of Fanners' contract of insurance. 
COMPWNT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 004 
19. As direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of its contract of insurance, 
Armstrongs have suffered general and special damages and other expenses incidental to the 
prosecution of this action. 
20. The Armstrongs have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and 
is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 as well as 
his costs incurred herein. 
21. The Armstrongs are entitled to immediate payment of policy benefits owing in 
an amount consistent with the Proof of Loss provided to Farmers and in an amount reflecting 
the costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred to prosecute this action which amounts are 
greater than $10,000.00. 
COUNT TWO 
BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING 
22. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations in paragraphs 1-21 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
23. At all times material hereto, Farmers' agents and employees including, but not 
limited to, David Nipp and Joes Bums were acting within the scope of their agency and/or 
employment with Farmers. Thereafter, Farmers ratified and approved the acts andlor omissions 
of its agents and employees. 
24. The acts and omissions of Farmers constitute a breach of Farmers' covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing owed to the Armstrongs as an insured of Farmers. 
25. The acts and omissions of Farmers were done intentionally and with a conscious 
disregard of the rights of the Armstrongs and in a manner intended to deprive the Armstrongs 
of their rights under contract of insurance and the intended protections and benefits flowing 
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therefrom. The conduct of Farmers, its agents andlor employees, was oppressive, fraudulent, 
wanton, malicious, outrageous and in bad faith. 
26. The Armstrongs have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and 
is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to LC. 4 41-1839 andlor I.C. 4 12- 
120 as well as their costs incurred herein. 
27. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned wrongful conduct of 
Farmers, the Armstrongs have suffered damages, including costs and attorney fees necessary to 
prosecute this action, in an amount in excess of $10,000.00. 
COUNT THREE 
NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION AND CLAIM ADJUSTMENT 
28. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-27 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
, 29. At all times material hereto, Farmers had a duty to acknowledge and act 
promptly upon the Armstrongs' claim for insurance benefits. Farmers had a duty to provide the 
Armstrongs proof of loss forms and to reasonably evaluate the Armstrongs' claim before 
denying coverage for the same. 
30. Farmers breached its duty by failing to accept, acknowledge and act promptly to 
investigate and adjust the Armstrongs' claim. Farmers breached its duty by failing to conduct a 
reasonable investigation prior to denying the Armstrongs' claim. Farmers breached its duty by 
refusing to provide proof of loss forms. 
3 1. As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs had 
to undertake to repair and replace the damage to their home without the benefit of insurance 
proceeds to cover such loss. 
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32. As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs 
have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney fees. 
33. As a result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs have suffered general and 
special damages in an amount in excess of $10,000.00. Farmers' breach of duty was 
oppressive, wanton, malicious and outrageous. 
COUNT FOUR 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 
34. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-33 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
35. Idaho Code 8 41-1329 sets forth unfair claim settlement practices applicable to 
the insurance claim settlement practices of Farmers and, as such, defines the standard of care 
for insurers. The acts of Farmers, its agents andlor employees, as described herein, were unfair 
and deceptive acts and practices in contravention of the standards of care set forth under I.C. $ 5  
41 -1329(1); 41-1329(2); and 41-1329(4). Farmers' actions were also in direct contravention of 
I.C. 8 41-1831. 
36. As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Amtrongs 
have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney fees. 
37. As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' violations of LC. $ 9  41-1329 and 
41-183 1, the Armstrongs have suffered and continue to suffer general and specific damages in 
an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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COUNT FIVE 
CONSTRUCTWE FRAUD 
38. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-37 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
39. A special relationship of insurer and insured existed between the Armstrongs and 
Farmers. The Armstrongs trusted and relied upon Farmers agent Nipp to provide them with 
adequate insurance coverage and to provide them with true and correct information regarding 
the insurance coverage they were purchasing from Farmers. The Armstrongs did inquire and 
ask agent Nipp as about the status of their insurance coverage under their Farmers 
homeowner's policy prior to the installation of their swimming pool. 
40. Farmers, acting through agent Nipp, did represent and promise the Armstrongs 
that they would have insurance coverage following the installation of the swimming pool at 
their home. Farmers' representations and promises were material and Farmers knew it was 
important to the Armstrongs that they have adequate insurance coverage following the 
installation of the swimming pool at their home. 
41. Farmers' representations and promises were false and made with the knowledge 
of their falsity or in ignorance of their truth. 
42. The Armstrongs trusted Farmers and agent Nipp. The Armstrongs relied on the 
representations of Farmers and agent Nipp to their detriment. Farmers' representations did 
deceive and falsely mislead the Armstrongs into a false belief concerning the nature and status 
of their homeowner's coverage with Farmers. 
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43. As a result of Farmers' misrepresentation, the Arrnstrongs have suffered 
consequent and proximate injury in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that: 
1. They be awarded those policy benefits pursuant to his contract of insurance with 
Farmers in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. They be awarded special and general damages for Farmer's contractual breach, 
bad faith and other fraudulent conduct in an amount in excess of $10,000.00; 
3. They be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $41-1839 andfor I.C. $ 
12-120, including all applicable prejudgment interest and costs; and 
4. For such other and further relief that the Court deems proper. 
DATED this of December 2003. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
By: A&- 
Douglas S. harfice, 0 f 6 e  Firm 
~ t t o k e ~ s  for plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE PERSONS. 
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VERIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai' ) 
GLENDA ARMSTRONG, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; I have read the foregoing 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL; I know the contents thereof, and I state 
the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
GLENDA ARMSTRONG 0 
&'day of December 2003. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this - 
7 
NOT PUBLIC fofthe State of Idaho 
R e s i d z a t  &ff-d 
Commission Expires ~/a/d7 
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PATRICK E. MILLER 
Attorney at Law 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-8 1 15 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
ISBA# 1771 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA ) 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV-03-92 14 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) 
VS. , ) FEE CATEGORY: I(l)(a) 
) FEE: $47.00 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE ) 
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN that Patrick E. Miller, 701 Front Avenue, Suite 101, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho, appears, in the above-entitled matter as attorney of record for defendants. 
DATED this 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTwY that on the &day of ,2004, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by and addressed to 
the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons 
618 North 41h Street 
P. 0 .  Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
& U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED - 
OVERNIGHT MAIL - 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884 - 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
PATRICK E. MILLER 
Attorney at Law 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-81 15 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
ISBA# 1771 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI32 FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 1 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV-03-9214 
Plaintiffs, ) ANSWER 
VS. ) 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE ) 
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown, ) 
Defendants. 
j 
COMES NOW the defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, and admits, denies 
and alleges as follows: 
In answer to Paragraph I, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
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11. 
In answer to Paragraph II, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
111. 
In answer to Paragraph ID, this defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a 
justiciable claim as to this defendant; therefore, no response is required of this defendant. 
IV. 
In answer to Paragraph N, this defendant alleges that the paragraph sets forth legal 
conclusions to which no response is required and upon which plaintiff retains the burden of proof. 
v .  
In answer to Paragraph V, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
VI. 
In answer to Paragraph VI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs purchased a policy of 
insurance referred to as a protector plus homeowner's insurance policy, with policy number 91828- 
03-27, which had a policy period from March 24,2003, to March 23,2004. This defendant alleges 
that any and all obligations pursuant to the terms of the policy of insurance were in accordance with 
the specific, stated terms and conditions of the policy. 
VII. 
In answer to Paragraph VII, this defendant alleges that plaintiffs purchased a policy of 
insurance, policy number 91828-03-27, with a stated policy period of March 24,2003, to March 23, 
2004, and that the terms, conditions and obligations were set forth within the policy of insurance. 
This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations stated therein. 
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VIII. 
In answer to Paragraph VIII, this defendant denies that David Nipp was a general agent of 
this defendant. This defendant alleges that it is without knowledge or information sufficient to form 
a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations stated therein; therefore, this defendant denies 
said allegations and leaves plaintiffs to their proof. 
IX. 
In answer to Paragraph IX, this defendant admits, upon information and belief, that the 
plaintiffs' home was flooded with water from the swimming pool. This defendant alleges that it is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of any and all remaining 
allegations contained therein; therefore, this defendant denies said allegations and leaves plaintiffs 
to their proof. This defendant specifically denies any allegations intended, by the language of this 
paragraph, to assert that David Nipp constituted a general agent of the defendant. 
X. 
In answer to Paragraph X, this defendant denies any and all allegations stated therein that 
Davrd Nlpp was a general agent of this defendant. In answer to any and all remaining allegations 
stated therein, this defendant alleges that i t  is without knowledge or information sufficient to form 
a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations; therefore, this defendant denies said allegations 
and leaves plaintiffs to their proof. 
XI. 
In answer to Paragraph XI, this defendant admits the allegations stated therein. 
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XII. 
In answer to Paragraph XlI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs responded to the coverage 
denial. This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
XIII. 
In answer to Paragraph Xm[, this defendant admits that this defendant responded to the 
request, anddeniedcoverage. This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations stated therein. 
This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
XIV. 
In answer to Paragraph XIV, this defendant admits that plaintiffs submitted a document, 
whlch plitintrffs asse~ted constituted a proof of loss. This defendant denies any and all remaining 
allegations contained therein. This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
xv. 
In answer to Paragraph XV, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
XVI. 
In answer to Paragraph XVI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs paid their policy premium. 
This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations contained therein. 
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XVII. 
In answer to Paragraph XVII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior 
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
XVIII. 
In answer to Paragraph XVIII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XIX. 
In answer to Paragraph XU(, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XX. 
In answer to Paragraph XX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXI. 
In answer to Paragraph XXI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior 
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
XXIII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXZD[, this defendant denies that David Nipp was an agent or 
employee of this defendant and that, as alleged by plaintiff, he acted in a manner so as to bind this 
defendant. This defendant admits that Joel Bum acted within the course and scope of his 
employment with this defendant. This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations contained 
therein. 
XXIV. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 5 
In answer to Paragraph XXIV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
x x v .  
In answer to Paragraph XXV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXVI. 
In answer to Paragraph XXVI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXVII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXVII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXVIII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXVDI, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior 
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
XXIX. 
In answer to Paragraph XXIX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXX. 
In answer to Paragraph XXX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXI. 
In answer to Paragraph XYXI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXIII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXIII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 6 
XXXIV. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXIV, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior 
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
x x x v ;  
In answer to Paragraph XXXV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXVI. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXVI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXVII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXVII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XXXVIII. 
In answer to Paragraph XXXVIII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all 
prior paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
XXXIX. 
In answer to Paragraph XXYIX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XL. 
In answer to Paragraph XL, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
XLI. 
In answer to Paragraph XLI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein, 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
COMES NOW the defendant, by way of affirmative defense, alleges as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 7 
I. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim against this defendant upon which relief can be 
granted. 
11. 
That the terms andconditions of the policy of insurance, policy number 91828-03-27, policy 
period March 24, 2003, through March 23,2004, defined the terms, conditions and obligations of 
this defendant. 
111. 
That this defendant complied with the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. 
IV. 
That the asserted claim by the plaintiffs was not covered by the terns and conditions of the 
policy of insurance as entered into with this defendant. 
WHEREFORE, having answered, this defendant prays that plaintiffs' Complaint be 
dismissed; that this defendant be awarded its costs and attorney fees occurred herein; for such other 
and further relief as the court deems just. 
Pursuant to Rule 38(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this defendant herein demands a trial 
by a jury of no less than twelve (12) persons in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this &day of h d  J ,2004. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day of ,2004. I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Douglas S.  Marfice 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons 
618 North 4* Street 
P. 0. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Afene, ID 83816-1336 
U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED - 
OVERNIGHT MAIL - 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884 - 
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619 L" l I i I_,_- 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
6 18 North 41h Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 




County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV- 03-92 14 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. 
MARFICE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Douglas S. Marfice, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney for the Plaintiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth in this affidavit. 
2. I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following: 
Exhibit "A": The Armstrongs' Protector Plus Homeowner's Insurance Policy 
Number 91 828-0327 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. MARFICE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 3UDGMEMP- 1 0 2 2 
4. Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following: 
Exhibit "B": The Armstrongs' swom statement of Proof of Loss 
5. Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following: 
Exhibit "C": Farmers letter of November 14, 2003 denying the Armstrongs' 
claim. 
6 .  Exhibit C provides in material part: 
Specifically, coverage afforded is stated as 
"Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of 
water from within a plumbing, heating or air 
conditioning system, or from within a household 
appliance." Your swimming pool is not part of a 
plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, nor 
is it a household appliance. Therefore, our original 
decision to decline coverage will remain. 
7. Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following: 
Exhibit " D :  excerpts from the deposition transcript of Brian Armstrong and 
exhibits thereto. 
8. Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following: 
Exhibit " E :  excerpts from the deposition transcript of Glenda Armstrong and 
exhibits thereto. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
me before this $2 V a y  of January 2005. 
&&do 
Noh& ~ubf ic  for Idaho 
~ K s i d i n ~  at Coeur d' Alene 
MY Commission expires: //-2. -6' 7 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 5. MARFICE I N  SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 0 2 :5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifL that on the M a y  of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 -2 vemight Mail PO Box E and Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328 - Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. MARRCE I N  SUPPORT OF 




YOUR PROTECTOR PLUS PACKAGE POLICY 
IDAHO 
- Farrnkrs Insurance Group of Companie8 
==!E! 4680 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 9001 0 
==!E! - 
L%!%z== - 
__I - - 
==!E! -. 
_s -= 
 Dear customer: -=  =- The member Companies and Exchanges of the Farmers lnsurance Group of  -= Companies would like to take this opportunity to say "Thank You" for your recent 
 business. 
E!=!e!E  - . Your needs for insurance protection are very important to us. We are committed to = providing you with the best customer service at the lowest cost possible. -= 
- If you haven't already done so, please take a moment to review your policy to 
=5~!!= - assure you understand the coverages. This is a very important document that 
=cE!!!E - you'll want to keep in a safe place.  - 
 
=_ - If you have any questions regarding your policy or if you would like information 
 about other coverages, feel free to contact me. - = - Again, thank you for choosing us for your insurance protection. We look forward  
=cE!!!E - to sewing you. 
= -
%?==!?=  Sincerely, 
- --  = 
,-  David R. Nipp LUTCF -
!= Your ~ a r m e r s " ~ ~ e n t  
( 2 0 8 )  773-8484 
PROTECTOR PLUS DECLARATIONS 
HOMEOWNERS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY O F  IDAHO, POCATELLO, IDAHO Replaces all prior Declarations, if any 
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
. . .  . . . .  .: . . . .  . . :vu\Ro+ , ,  ::,;,.; ;.: ; ,  ; . , .  . . . . . . : . . . .  ! !.. ..... . . . . . .  . .  . . .  :.. . .... .: :... ., . ::. : 
. . .  m$.mwonoN . iy : . . .  :. . . . . . .  C O N S T R ~ C T I ~ ~ P E : !  . . . . . . . . .  i: . I::~ I : .  : . .  , ....:...<.......... . . :  ".R&FNPE .; . . . . . . . .  : , . : & ' ~ ~ ~ B  . ,+CUP,WCV. . . . . . . . . .  : . . , ~ . .  , . 
1 9 9 3  FRAME ASPHALT COMPOSITION 0 0 1  OWNER 
TRANSACTIONTYPE: NEW B U S I N E S S  
The Policy Period is effective(not priorto time appliedfor) at described residence premises. 
EGO471 
EGO08 ' ZED AMENDING PERSONAL I N J U R Y  - PROTECTOR PLUS 
EGO18 I =ED 1 AMENDING DEBRIS  REMOVAL COVERAGE AND POLLUTION EXCLUSION I 
EXCLUSION AMENDING S E C T I O N  II - L I A B I L I T Y  
SEWER AND DRAIN WATER DAMAGE COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT 
ENDORSEMENT AMENDING S E C T I O N  I - WATER DAMAGE 
S P E C I A L  L I M I T S  ON SPORTS CARDS 
OPTIONAL PAYMENT PLAN ON RENEWAL O F  POLICY 
S P E C I A L  STATE PROVISIONS - IDAHO 
RESIDENCE GLASS ENDORSEMENT - WAIVER O F  DEDUCTIBLE 
ISSUING OFFICE: 
P . O .  BOX 4 8 2 0  
POCATELLO, I D  8 3 2 0 5  
. . . .  . . . .  . . .  ,~ . .  
.. P & I ~ Y & M B 6 R ; : , . . : .  : . . . .  ; : ;: ..I . . P O ~ I C y ~ v I p p .  ; ,  : . ,  . : . :  : :. , : :  . . . .  /:P~,~CYEQITIO$ 
DISCOUNTS 
NEW HOME, AUTO/HOME, AND NON SMOKER DISCOUNTS HAVE BEEN A P P L I E D  TO YOUR POLICY.  
This policy will continue for successive policy periods, if: (1) we elect to continue this insurance, and (2) if you pay the renewal 
premium for each suocessivepolicy period as required by our premiums, rules and forms then in effect. 
INSURED'S NAME & MAILING ADDRESS: LOCATIONOR DESCRIPTION OF RESIDENCE PREMISES: 
(Some as mailing address unless othewisestnted.) 
BRIAN L ARMSTRONG AND GLENDA A ARMSTRONG 
3 2 5 9  N 1 4 T H  S T  
C D ALENE I D  
DEDUCTIBLES POLICY ACTIVITY 
I 
0 4  
Deductible is applicable to covered losses under 
CoverageA, 8, C. Previous Balance 
THE FOLLOWING DEDUCTIBLE(S) APPLIES TO THE 2 3 5 . 5 2  Premium 
STANDARDTIME 
1 2 : O l  A.M, 9 1 8 2 8 - 0 3 - 2 7  
P E R I L S  NAMED: 
GLASS: $ 5 0 0  
1 0 . 0 0  Fees 
ANY 'TOTAC BALANCE 
24 5 . 5 2CR Paymentsor Credits ~&C;~P,IT,~$;~;~~~ 
TO YOUR NEXT BILLING. 
BALANCES OVER $7.00 
$ NONE Total AREDUE UPON RECEIPT. 
FROM: 
0 3 - 2 3 - 1 9 9 9  
I i I I 
Countersignature This Declarations page is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls 
anything to the contrary. It is otherwise subject to all other terms of the policy. 
AGENT: David R. Nipp LUTCF 
AGENTPHONE: ( 2 0 8 ) 7 7 3 - 8 4 8 4  AGENTNUMBER: 7 5  67 3 3 0  
n r )  7 
ccshm Authonred Representntre - 
TO' 
0 3 - 2 3 - 2 0 0 0  
L I 
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Agreement 3 SECTION I - CONDITIONS 
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SECTION I - PROPERTY 
Coverages: 
..................... Coverage A - Dwelling 4 
Coverage B - Separate Structures 4 
.................................... Coverage C - Personal Property 5 
Special Limits on Certain Personal Property-.--. 5 
. Personal Property not covered 6 
Coverage D - Loss of Use 6 
Additional Coverages 6 
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Coverage A . Dwelling 7 
. . Coverage B Separate Structures 7 
Coverage C - Personal Property 8 
SECTION I .- LOSSES NOT INSURED 
Applying to 
Coverage A and I3 - Dwelling and 
Separate Structures and 
Coverage C - Personal Property 9 
SECTION 11- LIABILITY , 
Coverages: 
- ........................ Coverage E Personal Liability ... 13 
.............. . Coverage F Medical Payments to Others 13 
.. Additional Coverages - 14 
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. Applying to Coverage E 14 
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Applying to Coverage E and F 15 
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... Applying to the Entire Policy 17 
RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS . 19 
This policy is a legal contract between you (the policyholder) and us (the Company) 
IT CONTAINS CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS. 
READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY. 
AGREEMENT 
We will provide the insurance described in this policy. In return you will pay the premium and comply with all policy 
conditions. 
DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this policy. "you" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and spouse if a 
resident of the same household. "We,""us" and "our" mean the Company named in the Declarationswhich provides 
this insurance. In addition, certain words appear in bold type. They are defined as follows: 
1. Actual Cash Value - means replacement cost of the property at the time of loss, less depreciation. 
2. Aircraft - means any device used or designed for flight including self-propelled missiles and spacecraft, except 
model or hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry people or cargo. 
3. Annual aggregate limit - means the total amount we will pay for all occurrences which happen in each 12 
month period, beginning with the inception date of this policy, regardlessof the number of such occurrences. 
4. Bodily injury - means bodily harm, sicknessor disease, including care, loss of services and death resulting from 
that injury. 
5. Business - means any full or part-time trade, professionor occupation. 
6. Business property - means property pertaining to or intended for use in business. 
7. Earthquake- means shaking or trembling of the earth, whether caused by volcanic activity, tectonic processes or 
any other cause. 
8. Earth ~ o v e m e n t  - means movement of earth, inoluding, but not limited to the following: 
a. earthquake, landslide or mudflow, all whether combined with water or not. 
b. collapse, settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, subsidence, erosion, sinking, rising, shifting, expanding, or 
contractingof earth, all whether combined with water or not. 
c. volcanic eruption, including explosion, lava flow and volcanicaction. 
9. lnsured - means you and the following persons if permanent residentsof your household: 
a. your relatives, 
b. anyone underthe age of 21, 
Under Section II - Liability, insured also means: 
c. any person or organization legally responsible for animals or watercraft owned by you, or anyone included in 
9a or Qb, and covered by this policy. Any person or organization using or having custody of these animals or 
watercraft in the course of any business or without permission of the owner is not an insured. 
d. any while employed by you or anyone in 9a or 9b with respectto any vehicle covered by this policy. 
10. lnsured location- means: 
a. the residence premises; 
b. any other premises you acquire during the policy period for use as a residence; 
c. that part of any other premisesshown in the Deciarationswhich you use as a residence; 
d. any premises you use in connection with the premises included in 1 Oa, 1 Ob or 1 Oc. 
e. that part of a premises not owned by any insured but where an insured is temporarily residing. 
f. that part of a premises occasionally rented to any insured for non-business purposes. 
g. vacant land, other than farm land, owned by or rented to any insured and shown in the Declarations. 
h. land owned by or rented to you and on which you are building a one or two family dwelling to be used as your 
residence. 
i. cemetery plots or burial vaults of an insured. 
11. Motor vehicle - means: 
a. a motorized land vehicle, including a trailer, semi-trailer or motorized bicycle, designed for travel on public 
roads. 
b. any vehicle while being towed or carried on a vehicle desoribed in 1 1 a. 
c. any other motorized land vehicle designed for recreational use off public roads. 
56-5274 4TH EDITION 4-89 
F A R M  E R S b -  
Wall-to-wallcarpeting attached to the structureis part of the structure. 
We do not cover land or the value of land, including land on which the separate structure is located or the cost to 
restore, replace, repair or rebuild land. If a covered loss causes damage to a separate structure and to the land on 
the residence premises, we do not cover any increased cost to repair or rebuild the separate structure because of 
damage to the land. 
We do not cover separate structureswhich are intended for use in business or which are actually used in whole or 
in part for business purposes. 
Coverage C - Personal Property 
We cover personal property owned or used by an insured while it is anywhere in the world. At your request after a 
loss we will also cover personal property: 
a. owned by others while the property is on the part of the residence premises occupied by an insured. However, 
property of tenants not related to the insured is not covered. 
b. owned by a guest while the property is in any residence occupied by an insured. 
c. owned by and in the physical custody of a residence employee while in the service of an insured anywhere in 
the world. 
Special Limits On Certain Personal Property 
The limits shown below do not increase the Coverage C limit of insurance shown in the Declarations. The limit for 
each numbered group is the total limit for any one loss for all property in that group. 
1. $1,000 or 10% of Coverage C limit (whichever is greater) on personal property usually located at an insured's 
residence, other than the residence premises. 
This limit does not apply to personal property in a newly acquired principal residence for 45 days after moving 
begins. 
2. $100 on money, bank notes, medals, coins, bullion, platinum, gold and silver other than goldware and silverware, 
and collectionsof all such property. 
3. $1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes other than bank notes, 
manuscripts, passports, tickets and stamp collections. 
4. $1,000 on watercraft, and windsurfers, including their trailers, furnishings, equipment and outboard motors. 
5. $1,000 on trailers not used with watercraft. 
6. Jewelry, watches, precious and semi-precious stones, and furs, including articles for which fur represents the 
principal value, are insured for accidental direct physical loss or damage. The following exclusions and limitations 
apply: 
a. on loss caused by theft, $1,000 on any one article and $2,500 total limit.. 
b. on loss caused by perils named under Coverage C of this policy other than theft, the limit shown in the 
Declaration for Coverage C will apply. 
c. on loss caused by perils not named and not excluded in this policy, $1,000 on any one article and $2,500 total 
limit. 
d. We do not cover loss or damage resulting from any processof refinishing, renovating, repairing, restoration01 
retouching; moths, vermin, insects, wear and tear, deterioration, inherent defects or faulty manufacturing. 
7. $2,500 on theft of silverware, goldware and pewtermare, including articles for which such metal represents the 
principal value. 
8. firearms are insured for accidental direct physical loss or damage. The following exclusions and limitations apply: 
,+ 
a. $1,000 on loss caused by theft. 
b. on loss caused by perils named under Coverage C of this policy other than theft, the limit shown in the 
Declarationsfor Coverage C will apply. 
c. $1,000 on loss caused by perils not named and not excluded in this policy. 
d. We do not cover loss or damage resulting from any processof refinishing, renovating, repairing, restoration or 
retouching; dampness or extremes in temperatures; vermin, insects, wear and tear, deterioration, inherent 
defects, faulty manufacturing, rust, fouling or explosion; marring, scratching, tearing or denting unless caused 
by fire, thieves or accidentsto conveyances. 
F A R M E R S ' .  
The limit of insurance, including debris removal, for any one loss will not exceed 5% of the limit applying to the 
dwelling, nor more than $500 for any one tree, shrub or plant. This coverage is in addition to the limit applying to 
the dwelling. 
4. Fire Department Service Charge. We pay up to $500 as an additional amount of insurance for sewice charges 
made by a fire department when called to protect covered property from an insured loss. In no event will we pay 
more than $500 in charges resulting from any one servicecall. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
5. Emergency Removal of Property. We pay for direct loss from any cause to covered property: 
a. while being removedfrom a premisesendangered by a loss covered under LOSSES INSURED, and 
b. while removed for not more than 30 days from the date of removal. 
This coverage does not change the amount of insurance applying to the covered property. 
6. Credit Card, Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money. We pay up to $1.500 as an additional amount 
of insurance for loss to an insured caused by: 
a. theft or unauthorized use of credit or fund transfer cards issued to an insured. 
b. forgery or alteration of a checkor other negotiable instrument. 
c. acceptance in good faith of counterfeit United States or Canadian paper money 
No deductible applies to a, b or c above 
We do not cover: 
a. business pursuits or d~shonest acts of any insured. 
b. use of anv card bv a resident of vour household or any person entrusted with any card if an insured nas not . . 
met the tdrms under which such 6ard is issued. 
Defense of a claim or suit against any insured or any insured's bank for liability under this coverage: 
a. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit we consider proper. Our duty to defend any claim or suit ends 
when we pay a loss equal to the limit of insurance. 
b. We will defend at our expense and with attorneys of our choice a claim made or suit brought against any 
insured for payment under Credit or Fund Transfer Card Coverage. 
c. At our option and expense we may defend the insured or the insured's bank against a suit to enforce 
payment under Forgery Coverage. 
7. Collapse of Buildings. We cover accidental direct physical loss to covered property covered in A and B if caused 
by collapse which occurs due to: 
a. weight of ice, snow, sleet or rain which collectson a roof; 
b. weight of people, contents or equipment while on a roof. 
8. Freezer Food Spoilage. We will pay for the cost of loss or damage to food in a freezer on the residence 
premises which thaws due to interruption of power or other utility service which originates off the residence 
premises. 
9. Guaranteed Replacement Cost Coverage - Buildings. We will settle covered loss to buildings under Coverage A - 
Dwelling and Coverage B - Separate Structuresat replacement cost regardless of the limits of insurance shown 
on the Declarations Page, subject to the following provisions: 
a. You have insured your dwelling and separate structures to 100% of their replacement cost as determined by 
our Building Replacement Cost Guide. 
b. You have accepted each annual adjustment in building amounts in accordance with Value Protection Clause 
in the policy. 
c. You have notified us within 90 days of the start of any physical changes which increase the value of your 
insured buildings by $5,000 or more, and pay any additional premium. This includes any new structures and 
any additions to or remodeling of your dwelling or other structureson the residence premises. 
d. You have complied with all of the "Loss Settlement" provisions shown in Condition 3 of Section I of the policy 
applicable to Coverages A and 5. 
We do not cover any costs required to replace, rebuild, stabilize or otherwise restore the land. 
LOSSES INSURED 
Coverage A - Dwelling 
Coverage B - Separate Structures 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage A and 8, except as provided in 
Section I - Losses Not Insured. 
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14. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking, burning or bulging of a steam, hot water or air conditioning 
system,or appliance for heating water. 
This peril does not include loss caused by or resulting from freezing. 
15. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning system or household appliance. 
This peril does not include loss on the residence premises while the dwelling is unoccupied unless you have 
used reasonable care to: 
a. maintain heat in the building, or 
b. shut off the water supply and drain the system and appliance of water. 
16. Sudden and accidentaldamage from artificially generated electricalcurrent. 
This peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor, microchipor similar electroniccomponent. 
SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED 
Applying to Coverage A and B - Dwelling and Separate Structuresand Coverage C - Personal Property 
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or caused directly or indirectly by: 
1. EarthMovement. -  Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute to or aggravate earth movement. Also, earth movement -= - can occur naturally to cause loss, or combine with acts or omissions of persons to cause loss. Whenever earth = - movement occurs, the resulting loss is always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover = - direct loss by fire or explosions resulting from earth movement. 
= - The following examples are set forth to help you understand this exclusion and are not meant to be all-inclusive. = - 
= EXAMPLE 1: -
 EEL^=^ Rain falls on soil inadequately compacted or maintained by a builder, neighbor or you. As a result, earth -
 EEL^=^ movement occurs,causing loss to the dwelling or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy. - 
= - EXAMPLE2: 
7 = - Cracks occur in your dwelling or separate structure because it is built on natural or fill soil which is expansive 
m = and the dwelling or structure is not designed or constructed to withstand the soil movement. Such loss is not -= covered under this policy. - - EXAMPLE3: = 
%z!!!!= - Water leaks from a pipe which causes settling, and the settling causes loss to the dwelling, separate 
7 
%z!!!!= 
structure, or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy, regardless of the cause or causes of -
= - the water leak. 
= 2. Water damage. -= - Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute to or aggravate water damage. Also water damage can = - occur naturally to cause loss or combine with acts or omissions of persons to cause loss. Whenever water  
a
damage occurs, the resulting loss is always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover -  direct-loss to the dwsng,  separate structures, or personal property if caused by fire or explos~on res&&ing,fro-m 
wE!Er!54I"=95 = 
7n - The following examples are set forth to help you understand this exclusion and are not meant to be all-inclusive. 
= --  EXAMPLE 1 : -
5~!!!== Rain water collects on or soaks into the ground surface. Because of faulty design, construction or -= -- maintenance of the residence premises, your neighbor's property or water diversion devices, the water = causes loss to the dwelling, separate structure, or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy. 
EXAMPLE2: 
A pipe under your sink breaks, and water damages your wallpaper, carpeting and personal property. The 
water also gets under the dwelling or separate structure causing earth movement which resuits in cracking 
of the foundation and walls. The loss to the wallpaper, carpeting and personal property is covered, but the 
loss to the foundation and walls is not covered by this policy. 
EXAMPLE3: 
Water which has backed up through sewers or drains, or water below ground level causes loss to the 
dwelling, separate structure or personal property. Such Loss is not covered by this policy. 
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SECTION I - CONDITIONS 
1. Insurable Interest and Limit of Insurance. 
Even if more than one person has an insurable interest in the covered property, we pay the smallest of the 
following amounts. 
a. an amount equal to the insured's interest, or 
b. the applicable limit of insurance. 
2. Your Duties AfterLoss. 
If a covered loss occurs, you will perform the following duties: 
a. give written noticeto us or our agent without unnecessarydelay. In case of theft, also notify the police. In case 
of loss under the Credit or Fund Transfercard Coverage, also notify the issuerof the card. 
b. protect the property from further damage. Make any emergency repairs needed to protect the property from 
furtherdamage. Keep records of repair costs. - 
c make a list of all damaged or destroyed personal property showing In detall the quantity, descript~on, actual 
cash value and amount of loss. Anach all b~lls, receipts and related records that suppon your claim 
d. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) exhibit damaged property. 
(2) provide us with records and documents we may request, including banking or other financial records, if 
obtainable and permit us to make copies. 
(3) submit to examination under oath and sign a transcript of same. 
e. send us within 60 days after our request your signed sworn statementshowing: 
(1) time and cause of loss, 
(2) interest of the insured and all others in the property involved, 
(3) all legal claims against the property involved, 
(4) other insurance which may coverthe loss, 
(5) changes in title or occupancy of the property during the term of the policy, 
(6) specificationsand detailed repair estimates of any damaged building, 
(7) a &st of damaged or destroyed personal property describedin 2c, 
(8) receipts and records that support additional living expenses and loss of rents, 
(9) evidence which states the amount and cause of loss to support a claim under Credit or Fund Transfer 
Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money Coverage. 
3. Loss Settlement. 
Coverage A and B 
Covered loss to Buildings under Coverage A and B will be settled at replacement cost without deduction for 
depreciation, subject to the following methods: 
(1) Settlement under replacementcostwill not be more than the smallestof the following: 
(a) the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and use on the 
same premises. 
(b) the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the building intended for the same 
occupancy and use. 
(2) When the cost to repair or replace is morethan $1,000 or morethan 5% of the limit of insurance in this policy 
on the damaged or destroyed building, whichever is less, we will pay no more than the actual cash value of 
the damage until repair or replacement is completed. 
(3) At your option, you may make a ciaim underthis policy on an actual cash value basis for loss or damage to 
buildings. Within 180 days after loss you may make a claim for any additional amount on a replacementcost 
basis if the property has been repairedor replaced. 
Coverage C - 
a. The following types of property will be settled at full current cost or repair or replacement at the time of loss, 
without deduction for depreciation. 
(1) personal property and structuresthat are not buildings. 
(2) carpeting, domestic appliances, awnings, outdoor equipment and antennas, all whether or not attached to 
buildings. 
.. 
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12 SUII Aga~nst Us We may not be sued unless tnsre has been full compliance with all the terms of thrs pollcy Sult 
on or arlslng out of th~s pol~cy must be brought w~th~n o e year after the loss occdrs 
13. Our Options. We may repair or replace the damaged property with equivalent property. We may also take all or 
part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value. We will give you written notice of our intention 
within 30 days after receipt of your signed sworn statement of loss. 
14. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you. We will pay you unless another payee is named in the policy. 
We will pay within 60 days after: 
a. we reach agreementwith you, or 
b. a court judgment, or 
c. an appraisal award. 
A loss payment will not reduce the applicable limitof insurance. 
15. Abandoned Property. We need not accept property abandoned by an insured. 
16. Mortgage Clause. The word "mortgagee"includes trustee or loss payee. If a mortgagee is named in this policy, a 
covered loss will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more than one mortgagee is named, 
the order of payment will be the same as the order of the mortgagees. 
If we deny your claim, such denial will not apply to a mortgagee'svalid claim if the mortgagee: 
a knows and notlfres us of any change of ownershrp, occupancy or substantialchange in risk 
b Davs on demand anv Dremlum due if vou have faded to do so. 
c. submits a signed, sworn statement ofloss within 60 days after we notify the mortgagee of your failure to do so. 
Policy conditions relating to Other Insurance, Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss Payment apply to the 
mortgagee. 
We will give the mortgagee 10 days notice before cancelling this policy. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny payment to you: 
a. we have right of recoveryagainst any party responsible forthe loss, or 
b. at our option, we may pay off the entire mortgage debt to the mortgagee. In this event. we receive full transfer . .  - . . - - 
of the mortgage. 
A mortgagee'sclaim will not be impaired by transferof a right of reoovery 
17. No Benefit to Bailee. This insurance will not benefit any person or organization who may be caring for or 
handling property for a fee. 
SECTION II - LIABILITY 
Coverages 
Coverage E - Personal Liability 
We will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, property 
damage or personal injury resulting from an occurrence to which this coverage applies. Personal injury means any 
injury arising from: 
-  
- = (1) false arrest, lmprlsonment, rnal~clous prosecution and detention 
--  (2) wrongful evlctlon, entry. lnvaslon of rlghts of prlvacy - 
= - (3) libel, slander, defamation of,character. 
7 =- (4) discrimination because of race, color, religion or national origin. Liability prohibited by law is excluded. Fines 
7- and penalties imposed by law are covered.  
At our expense and with attorneys of our choice, we wiil defend an insured against any covered claim or suit. We = 
are not obligated to pay defense costs, including attorneys'fees of any claim or suit where you select an attorney not 
'--- 
chosen by us because there is a dispute between you and us over coverage. We may investigate and settle any 
claim or suit that we consider proper. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends once we have paid our limit of 
liability. 
Coverage F - Medical PaymentsTo Others 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses for services furnished to a person other than you or any resident of 
your household within 3 years from the date of an occurrence causing bodily injury. Medical expenses mean 
reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services, prosthetic devices, eyeglasses hearing aids, 
pharmaceuticals, ambulance, hospital, licensed nursing and funeral services. 
This coverage applies to: 
(a) persons on the insured location with permission of an insured; or 
10. Personal injury arising from or during the course of civic or public activities performedfor pay by an insured. , 
1 1. Personal injury to any resident of the residence premises. 
12. Any loss, cost, or expense resulting from the clean-up, detoxification, or treatment of any site used by you or any 
person acting on your behalf for the disposal, storage, handling, processing or treatment of waste. 
Applying To Coverage F - Medical Payments To Others 
We do not cover bodily Injury: 
1. To you or any resident of your residence premises except a residence employee. 
2. To a residence employee who is off the lnsured location and not inthe course of employment by an insured. 
3. To any person eligible to receive benefits provided or mandated under any workers'compensation, occupational 
disease or non-occupationaldisability law. 
4. Resulting from any nuclear hazard. 
- = Applying To Coverage E and F - Personal Liability and Medical PaymentsTo Others 
=Es  - E!%E~ We do not cover bodily injury, property damage or personal injury which: 5szz 
7 1. arises from or during the course of business pursuitsof an insured. - 
e - But we do cover: = - a. that part of a residence of yours which is rented or available for rent: 
ZEZ -  = (1) on an occasional basis for sole use as a residence. - 
L!E3 
(2) to no more than two roomersor boardersfor sole use as a residence. - 
= (3) as an office, studio or private garage. 
!5sE! - 
Es?.z b. part-time services performed directly by an insured under age 21 who is a resident of your household. - "Part-timewmeans no more than 20 hours per week. z!!!eE -
e 2. resultsfrom the rendering or failure to render business or professlonalse~ices. =  - 3. is either:.  e- a. caused Intentionally by or at the direction of an insured;or 
EE== s- b. results from any occurrence caused by an intentional act of any insured where the results are reasonably 
EE== foreseeable. ._ = 4. resultsfrom the legal liability of any lnsured because of home care servicesprovided to any person on a regular 
r=s==.z - , basis by or at the direction of: 
=?E!=!  
EEEE - a. any insured;  
sc!s!!3 - b. any employee of any insured;  -- c. any other person actually or apparently acting on behalf of any insured. 
= 
__I Regular basis means more than 20 hours per week. 
s!=e.e -
__. This exclusion does not apply to: 
S!E!E~ a. home care servicesprovided to the relatives of any insured; 
EsiZsii - b. occasionalor part time home care services provided by any Insured under 21 years of age. = 
=!S!Z .--- 5. resultsfrom an insured transmitting a communicable (including sexually transmitted)disease. 
__. 6. resultsfmm an existing condition on an uninsured location owned by or rented to an insured. 
7. results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of: 
a. aircraft 
b. motor vehicles 
c. jet skis and jet sleds or 
d. any other watercraftowned or rented to an insured and which: 
(1) has more than 50 horsepower inboard or inboard-outdrive motor power; or 
(2) is powered by one or more outboard motors with more than 25 total horsepower; or 
(3) is a sailing vessel 26 feet or more in length. 
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c. cooperate with and assist us in any matter relating to a claim or suit. 
d. under Damage to Property of Others Coverage, send us a sworn statement of loss within 60 days of the loss. 
Also exhibit any damaged property which is within the Insured's control. 
e. the insured will not, except at the insured's own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation 
or incur any expense except First Aid Expenses. 
4. Duties of an Injured Person - Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others The injured person or someone acting 
on behalf of the injured person will: 
a. give us written proof of claim as soon as possible, under oath if required. 
b. authorize us to obtain medical records and reports. 
The injured person will submit to physical examination by a doctorwe choose as often as we reasonably require. 
5. Payment of Claim - Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others. Payment under this coverage is not an admission 
of liability by an insured or us. 
6. Suit Against Us. We may not be sued unless there has been full compliance with the terms of this policy. No one 
has any right to make us a party to a suit to determine the liability of a person we insure. We may not be sued - 
7 
under Coverage E - Personal Liability until the obligation of the insured has been determined by final judgment 
=- or agreement signed by us. 
= 7. Bankruptcy of an insured. Bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured will not relieve us of our duties under this = - policy. = 
= 8. Other insurance - Coverage E - Personal Liability. This insurance is excess over any other valid and collectible - 
!s==! 
insurance. But if other insurance is specifically written as excess coverage over this policy, the limit of this policy 
 - applies first. = - 
s
If other insurance is written by us, only the highest limit of any one policy applies to the loss. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
Applying To The Entire Policy 
1. Entire contract. This policy, the Declarations and any endorsements include all the agreements between you 
and us relating to this insurance. 
2. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss under Section I or bodily injury, property damage or personal 
injury under Section II which occurs during the policy period as shown in the Declarations. 
3. Concealment or Fraud. This entire policy is void if any insured has knowingly and willfully concealed or 
misrepresentedany material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance before or after the loss. 
4. Coverage Changes. We may change this policy or replace it to conform to coverage currently in use. If we 
broaden coverages without charge during or within 60 days prior to the policy period, the broadened coverage 
will apply immediately. If we restrict any coverages, these restrictionswill not apply until the next renewal date. 
The change or new policy will be delivered to you or mailed to you at your mailing address shown on the 
Declarations at least 30 days before its effective date. 
No other change or waiver in this policy is valid except by endorsement, new Declarations, or new policy issued 
by us. 
If a premium adjustment is necessary,we will make the adjustment as of the effective date of the change 
- 
7= 5. Cancellation. - 
Z%=E!~E a. You may cancel this policy by: 
(1) returning it to us, or 
(2) notifying us in writing when cancellation is to take effect 
b. We may cancel this policy by mailing or delivering written notice to you, or your representative. Such notice will 
be mailed or delivered to the last address known to us. The mailing of it will be sufficientproof of notice. 
Cancellation Reasons 
We may cancel this policy only for the following reasons: 
(1) Non-payment of premium, whether payable to us or our agent. We may cancel at any time by notifying you 
at least 10 days before the date cancellation takes effect. 
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RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS 
(Applicable Only If This Policy Is Issued By The Fire lnsurance Exchange Or Farmers lnsurance 
Exchange) 
This policy is made an8 accepted in consideration of your premium payment to us. It is also in consideration of the 
power of attorney you signed as part of your application and the information you gave to us on your application. 
Some of your statementsactually become a part of the policy which we call "The Declarations." 
When you signed the power of attorney authority on your application, you authorized the Underwriters Association to 
execute interinsurance policies between you and other subscribers. 
Nothing in this policy is intended, or shall be construed, to oreate either: 
1. A partnershipor mutual insurance association. 
2. Any joint liability. 
We may sue or be sued in our own name, as though we were an individual, if necessarytc enforce any claims which 
arise under this policy. In any suit against us, service of process shall be upon the Underwriters Association, 
Attorney-in-Fact. 
Membership fees which you pay are not part of the premium. They are fully earned when you are granted 
membership and coverage is effective. They are not returnable. However, they may be applied as a credit to 
membershipfees required of you for other insurance which we agree to write. 
We hold the Annual Meeting of the members of the Fire lnsurance Exchange at our Home Office at Los Angeles, 
California, on the first Monday following the 15th day of March of each year at 10:OO a.m. If this policy is issued by 
the Farmers lnsurance Exchange, we hold suoh meeting at the same place on the same day each year at 2:00 p.m. 
The Board of ~ovemors may elect to change the time and place of the meeting. If they do so, you will be mailed a 
written or printed notice at your last known address at least ten (10) days before suoh a time. Otherwise, no notice 
will be sent to you. 
The Board of Governors shall be chosen by subscribersfrom among yourselves. This will take place at the Annual 
Meeting or at any special meeting which is held for that purpose. The Board of Governors shall have full power and 
authority to establish such rules and regulations for our management as are not inconsistent with the subscriber's 
agreements. 
Your premium for this policy and all payment made for its continuance shall be payable to us at our Home Office or 
such location named by us in your premium invoice. 
The funds which you pay shall be placed to your credit on our records. They will be applied to the payment of your 
proportion of losses and expenses and to the establishment of reserves and general surplus. The Board of 
Governors or its Executive Committee has the authority to deposit, withdraw, invest, and reinvest such funds. You 
agree that any amount which the Board of Governorsallocatesto our surplus fund may be retained by us. Also, after 
provision is made for all of our liabilities, it may be applied to any purpose deemed proper and advantageous to you 
and other policyholders. 
This policy is non-assessable. 
This policy shall not be effective unless countersignedon the Declarations Page by a duly authorized representative 
of the Company named on the Declarations. 
The Company named on the Declarations has caused this policy to be signed by the Officers shown below. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGI~ Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona 
by Fire Underwriters Association, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
Attorney-in-Fact 
Farmers lnsurance Company of Oregon 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE@ Illinois Farmers Insurance Company 
by Farmers Underwriters Association, 
Attornevin-Fact Farmers lnsurance Company, lnc. 
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY* 
Farmers Insuranceof Columbus, Inc. 
Secretary ( Vice President :J 
EXTENDED REPLACEMENT COST AND ~6047a 
BUILDING ORDINANCE OR L A W  COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT 1st Edition 
PROTECTOR PLUS POLICY 
When this endorsement is attachedto your policy, the following provisionsapply: 
Extended Replacement Cost - Coverage A 
Under Section I - Property, Additional Coverages, ltem 9. Guaranteed Replacement Cost Coverage - 
Buildingsis deleted and replaced with the following: 
9. ExrendedReplacement Cost Coverage - Coverage A. We will pay to repair or replace covered loss under 
Coverage A - Dwelling up to 125% of the limits of insurance for Coverage A - Dwelling. 
You must agree to and comply with the following additional policy provisions: 
a. You must insure your dwelling to 100% of the replacementcost. 
b. You must accept each annual adjustment in building amounts in accordance with Value Protection 
Clause in the policy. 
c. You must notify us within 90 days of the start of any physicalchanges which increase the value of your 
insured buildings by $5,000 or more, and pay any additional premium. This includes any new 
structuresand any additions to or remodeling of your dwelling on the residence premises. 
We do not cover any costs required to repair, replace, rebuild, stabilize or otherwise restore the land 
This coverage does not apply to Coverage B - Separate Structures 
Under Section I - Property, conditions, 3. Loss Settlement, Coverage A and B is deleted and replaced 
with the following: 
3. Loss Settlement. 
Coverage A and Coverage B 
Covered loss to buildings under Coverage A - Dwelling and Coverage B - Separate Structures will be 
settUd at replacementcost without deduction for depredation, subject to the following methods: 
1. Settlement under replacementcost will not be more than the smallestof the following: 
a. the limit of insurance under this policy that applies to the damaged or destroyeddwelling or separate 
structure. 
b. the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and use on the 
same premises. 
c. the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the building intended for the same 
occupancy and use. 
2. When the costto repair or replace is more than $1,000 or morethan 5% of the limit of insurance in this 
policy on the damaged or destroyed building, whichever is less, we will pay no more than the actual 
cash value of the damage untilrepairor replacement is completed. 
3. At your option, you may make a claim under this policy on an actual cash value basis loss or damage 
to buildings. Within 180 days after loss you may make a claim for any additional amount on a 
replacementcost basis if the property has been repaired or replaced. 
This endorsement replaces any Guaranteed Replacement Cost provision which is currently in your policy 
Building Ordinance or Law Coverage 
Under Section I - Property, Losses Not Insured, ltem 5. is deleted. 
Enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating construction, repair or demolition of a building or other 
structure, unless endorsed on this policy. 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEBRIS REMOVAL 
COVERAGE AND POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
~6018 ' 
1st Edition 
When this endorsement is attached to your policy the following provisions apply: 
SECTION I - PROPERTY - ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1. Debris Removalis deleted and replaced with the following: 
1. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable expenses to remove debris caused by a covered loss to 
covered property under SECTION I - PROPERN. However, we will not pay any expenses incurred by 
you or anyone acting on your behalf to: 
a. extract pollutantsfrom land or water; or 
b. remove. restore or replace polluted land or water. 
If the amount of loss, including debris removal expense exceeds the limit of insurance, we will pay up to 
an additional 5% of the limit of insurance on the damaged property. 
SECTION II - LIABILITY- EXCLUSIONS 
Item 8 (Item 12 in Protector Plus) under SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS - Applying to Coverage E - Personal 
Liability is deleted and replaced with the following: 
8. (12) A. We do not cover bodily injury or property damage resulting from the actual, alleged or 
threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, release, migration or escape of pollutants: 
(1) at or from the insured location; 
(2) at or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time owned or occupied by or 
rented or loaned to you or any insured; 
(3) at or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time used by or for you or any 
person acting on your behalf for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of 
any pollutant; 
(4) which are or were at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of or processed 
as waste by or for you or any person or organization for whom you may be legally 
responsible; or 
(5) at or from any premises, site or location on which you or any person or organization acting 
directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations to: 
(a) transport any pollutant on or to any site or location used for the disposal, storage, 
handling, prooessingor treatmentof pollutants;or 
(b) test for, monitor, clean up, remove. contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants. 
5. We do not cover any loss, cost or expense arising out of any: 
1. Request, demand, or order that any insured or others test for, monitor, clean up, remove, 
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of 
pollutants; 
2. Claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for, 
monitoring, cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any 
way responding to or assessing the effects of pollutants. 
Pollutant or pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant. 
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste materials. Waste 
materials include materials which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned or 
reclaimed. 
Pollutant or pollutants does not mean smoke, soot or fumes from a fire caused by one or more 
of the Section I - Losses Insured. 
The following exclusion is added: 
We do not cover any claim or suit for actual, alleged, threatened or feared bodily injury or property 
damage for which you or any insured may be held legally liable because of actual, alleged, threatened or 
feared bodily injury or property damage resultingfrom lead or lead poisoning. 
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SPECIAL STATE PROVISIONS ENDORSEMENT - ~7581, IDAHO 
IDAHO 2nd Edition 
I Under General Condition 5, Cancellation, no notice of cancellation is valid unless we notify you at least 20 days before the date cancellation takes effect. I 
I General Cond~tlon 10. Polrcy Fees (does not apply to Moblle Homeowners Pol~cy) and the f~hh paragraph of 
tne Rec!procal Prov~s~ons, are deieted and replaced wlth the following 
Membership or policy fees which you pay are part of the premium but are fully earned when coverage is 
effective. They are not refundable (except as noted in a. and b. below), but may be applied as a credit to 
membership or policy fees required for other insurance accepted by us. 
l a. If we cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period, we shall refund all membership or policy fees. 
b. If you cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period because itdoes not agree with the 
application and is not as represented by the agent, we shall refund all membershipor policy fees. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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SPECIAL LIMITS ON SPORTS CARDS 
~6106 
1st Edition 
The following provisions apply when this endorsementis anached to your policy: 
Under SECTION I, Coverage C - Special Limits On Certain Personal Property: 
Item 12. is added as follows: 
12. $200 per card and $1,000 in the aggregate on sports cards, including but not limited to baseballcards. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
9 t '7 
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This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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CHILD MOLESTATION EXCLUSION 
SECTION II - LIABILITY ~4207 . 1st Edition 
We do not cover actual or alleged injury or medical expenses caused by or arising out of the actual, alleged, 
or threatened molestation of a child by: 
1. any insured;or 
2. any employeeof any insured; or 
3. any volunteer. person for hire, or any other person who is acting or who appears to be acting on behalf 
of any insured. 
Molestation includes but is not limited to any act of sexual misconduct, sexual molestation or physical or 
mental abuse of a minor. 
We have no duty to defend or settle any molestation claim or suit against any insured, employee of any 
insured, or any other person. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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OPTIONAL PAYMENT PLAN ON RENEWAL OF POLICY 1st Edition 
If we send you an offer to renew any of all of the coverages in your policy, we will send you a Renewal 
Premium Notice. You may pay the premium either in full or in two equal installments. 
If paid in installments,we will add a servicecharge when the policy is renewed. 
The first premium installment, including the service charge, shall be payable on or before the policy renewal 




Farmers Insmince Company of Idaho 
PO Box 4820 
PocatelIo ID 83205 .-- - - - -  - _ _  . 
Anached hereto and incorporated herein by reference are : 
D a t e v  Exhibit # 
Cas k. u F m ' 2  
Deponent/&-,+& -' 
(i) Policy Declarations; Reporter -r= - 
(ii) Exhibit "1" - Service MastcrMeny Maids invoice Naegeli @porti;tg Corporation (800) F;~X-:ZZF; FAX (sn:) 227-7123 
(~i i )  Exhibit "2" - Fahay  Floors estimate 
(iv) Exhibit "3" -Personal Property lnvcntory 
(v) Exhibit "4" - Modcnl Glass Company invoice 
PROOF OF LOSS TO COMPLY WITE( 
SECIlON 41-1839, IDAHO CODE 
NAME OF POLICY: 4" Edition, 'Your Protection Plus Package Policy" Idaho 
D A ~  ISSUED: 03/24/03 (Initial issue date 12/01/97) 
DATE EXPLRED: 03/23/04 
DATE OF LOSS: 07102103 
NAME OF INSUREDS: Brian L. Armstrong and Glenda A. Armstrong 
MORTGAGEE: GMAC 'Mortgage Corporation or Greenpoint Mortgage 
PO Box 10430 PO Box 79363 
VanNuys CA 91410 City of Industry CA 
91716-9363 
NUMBER OF POLICY 9 1828-03-27 
AGENT ISSUING POLICY: David R. Nipp 
FARMERS CLAIM NO.: 1003763049 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE at the time of the loss hereinatleer described, the above 
policy of insurance war; issued by Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (Famers 
Insurance Company of Idaho) to Brian and Glenda Armseong. 
PROOF OF LOSS - 1 
.. n?  A. 
COVERAGES: LIMITS: 
5 -Separate Structures: 
C - Personal Property: 
D -Loss of Use: 
$ 133,000.00 wlExtended Replacement 
Cost endorsement (E6047a). 
$ 13,300.00 p o t  applicable to this loss.] 
$ 99,750.00 
S 66,500.M) p o t  applicable to this loss.] 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES: [Applicable to this Loss] 
1. Debris Removal: s 5% of Dwelling Limit 
2. Emergency Repairs: % included in limits 
3. Emergency Removal of Property: S inciuded in limits 
AMOUNT CLAIMED UNDER THE TERMS OF TElS POLICY: 
a The insureds claim the sum of: [Approximate loss based on estimate] - 
. $ 3,603.83 (Dwelling Repair) Coverage A 
See. Exhibit "I ,  " ServiceMarter invoice. 
$ 2,691.00 fDwclling Repair) Covcrage A 
See, Exhibit "2, "Fairway Floors estimate, 
$ 23 1.72 (Pmonal Ropeny) Coverage C 
See, Exhibit "1,"p. 10 
$ 949.00 (Personal Property) Coverage C 
See, Exhibit "3. " 
$ 150.00 (Emergency repair) Additional Coverages 
included in Dwelling Repair invoice. 
See. Exhibif "1,"p. 9 as 'Service call," also Lnbor Ready iabor. 
$ 96.39 (Debris Removal) Additional Coverages 
Included in Dwelling Repair Invoice, 
&e, Exhibit "1,"p. 9 as "haul debris." 
$ 180.56 Residence Glass - Waiver of Deductible Endorsement (E6154 3* Ed.) 
Sec, Exhibit "4. " 
$ 7.902.50 Subtotal 
500.00 (Less deductible) 
7.4025 Total 
PROOF OF LOSS - 2 
The insureds have fulfilled all of the terms of the palicy in that all premiums were paid currcnt. 
No attempt to deceive the undmvriter was in any manner made at any time. AU ulformation 
heretofore givcn by the insured including prior oral and written notice of the loss to the company is a 
part of this Proof of Loss. Any other information that may be required will be furnished and 
considered part of this Proof of Loss. 
DATED t h i x d a y  of October 2003 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
Couxity of Kootenai ) 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
That they are the insureds in the above-entitled matter, that they have read thc foregoing 
document, and based on their information and belief, it contains m e  and accurate information. 
p&z%hi /&RJ& 
GLENDA A. ARMSTRONG 
tt 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s a  day of October 2003. 
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Claim Rep.: R&!' k h m  
B i i g  2WAnl~ulr 
CDA. TC) R381 J 
Type uf Lou Dtducniie CIpim Number Poky Number - 
Water Damage S U.OU U U 
Dotes: 
Date uf Lous: 07/02n]3 Dacc h i v e d :  07nM)3 
ServiceMasrer/Merry Maids 
Rwm: cbscl 
240.00 SF Walls 
17.25 SFFlwr 
flO0 SF Long Wall 
47.25 SF Ceiting 287.25 Sf W& & Ceiliay 
525 SYRooring 30.W L F M  Pcrimetu 
0.00 SF short wall 3n.m w CCL p m m n ~ r  
DESUUPnON Qm my17 .. . TOTAL 
W m  d o n  kom tlwr 4 7 . 3  SF 0.36 liI11 
~ p p b  anti-microbial agent 17.25 SF 0.16 7.56 
Drying fun (pa day) - No ~uciitoring 3.00 FA 33.00 K,.lH) 
1 Drying fan lur 3 days 
Bifold door sM (sLi@c) - dabs o* - DcWh 8: nsct 1.00EA 14.34 l4.2-b 
30.00 LF 1.15 34.50 
- 
W4.m SF Wall$ 154.88 SF Ceiling 558.88 SF WuUs & Ceiliog 
ISJ.88 SF Rwr 17.21 SY nooriag 5 0 . 9  30 Floor Pmmeter 
0.%) SF Lveg Wail 0.00 SFShon Wall 50.50 LF Ceil. Pameter 
DESCIUPTIOlS Qm UNI‘T TOTAL - . . . . . - - . , . -. . . . . -. . . -.  .- - 
Waxer cx't~~ctirrn boa awr ' 
LiR f q c t  liu drying 
Tesr out wet citrprt pad arid bag f o r ~ v j d  
Apply &-microbial agent 
4921 Duncan Dr. 
C~rewd'Alcae. 113 83811 
i',08)46i&33 (j09,k927.9-116 Flur(208)GGi47g 
DESCRIPTION Qm WIT TOTAL 
1 Dmgfao for 3 day 
STm carpet 4.00 Lf 3.29 13.16 
Dascbcud - 3 IW"  MDF 50.50 I.'? 1.34 67.67 
Paint hiucb~~ard - h+o uxis 50.30 LF 0.71 33.86 
Rmm Tutnt.: txrrcire m 565.23 
1,0924 SF Walk & Ceiling 
72.25 11 Floor PPimcv~ 
72.23 LF Cdl. Prrimaa 
.DESCRIPTION Qm U n T  TOTAL 
~~~-~ ~~ 
Water e~ructiiun From flollr 
lift carpa for dr)'mg 
Tear out wet urpe( pad and bg for &pod 
Appty anti-micmbial a$& 
Carpel p3d 
CluadnddadnrircoJrpt 
D r y q  f a n w  dq) - No monirwing 
1 Drying f w ~ s  lur I dry wd I fur3 day8 
Dehumidifiuunit (ps day) - No mmiinring 
I Dehu for 3 dap 
f*zceboanf - 3 tJJ' .WF 
Se~ccNaster/Nem, Maids 
4031 D~mcm Lh 
Coeurdftknc. ID 83615 
(20e)-c;Gi4433 (509)-977-9116 Far (20R)ri(i7-174G 
DESCRIPTION QNTY UNIT TOTAL - 
P m l  b&ard - two cum i ?  25 LF 0 7 1  51 30 
-- 
ROW Total~ Wtng mum 1.431.62 
Rwm: landing 
I l0.W SF Walk 2299 SFC~iling 132.99 SF Walls & CclIing 
22.99 SFFIW 2.55 SY Flnrring 13.75 LFFlmrPCnmetq 
0.W S F k  Wall 0.M) SF Short WaH 13.75 IE CcrL P&M 
DESCRIPTION Qm IJNm TOTAL 
. - .- 
Water chnaction tiom Door 
. L n ~ ~ f u r $ ? . i n g  
Tc'cu out wet -1 pad wd bbag fur disposal 
App+ mi-microbial +$en1 
1.9 cxining caqxt - labor Dnl! 
Clcm rmd carpet 
Basebniud - 3 LiJ' MDF 
P&t bascbad - two ccou 
Rwm Totalr: Iandtng 8 5 U O  
ServiceMastcr&fcny Maids 
4941 D u u m  Dr. 
CLW d'Alenc. 1U 83815 
(208)Gi-G633 (509)-927.94 lG Fax (tOR)GGi-4736 
Tax W # 82.0503855 
Rwm: hall 
370.33 SF Walls & Ceiling 
3G.51) LFFI'wr Pnirnera 
3G.3 LFC=.ilTPRimerer 
DESCRlFTION 
. . . . . .. .. . - - * QNTY UNlT TOTAL 
Wruer ex-swn tiom tlwr 
LiR carpci for *ilg 
T m  out wet wnpet ped and bag for disposal 
Appk  ti-microbial agent 
Cerpcl pad 
Lqv cwriap cnrpcl - 1Dbw cYdy 
C i a  and &dwize carpet 
Rwm: h c d w m  I 
JinGi SF Walls 1GG.X SFCding 636.93 SF W a s  & Ceiling 
IGGZG SFRm 18.47 SY fluwine 58.83 LF Flow Paboetcr 
0.00 SF Lme: Wall 0.00 SF&n Wd 38.63 LF Ccil P&m 
DESCRIPTION Qm UNIT TOTAL 
Wmix exlritction Crom !lwr 143.94 SF 0.36 51.82 
Lin carp1 for dqinp 15394 SF 0.21 30.23 
Tear out wct wrpn pad itnd bag for &spd 143.95 SF 0.25 35.90 
AppLy anti-microbial q c n l  287.88 SF 0 16 46.06 
OPll Y2fXJ3 Page: 5 
ServiceMaster/Merrg Maids 
m i n g  fan (pea dux) - No mmiloring 
1 Doing fan fur 3 days 
& . d - k h l u u l n s l  
DESCRIPTION t)mr UNlT TOTAL 
Warcr avwtiun &w1 fltur 
lift c m p d  lor wig 
Tear a wci ~arpet pad and bag for d i s p e l  
Appk anti-microbid ngmt 
CKpn pad 
L ~ J  &b;iuting c a p e  - luhK only 
Clcan and dcrrforiur carpd 
Baseboard - -31 and rrat 
.. 
be?m Torah clrt bdrm 1 7U37 
491 1 Uuncoo Dr. 
Coax 6Alenc. ID 11381 5 
(308)-667433 (39)-927-9416 Fa (208)(i67JiJG 
1ZR.O SF Walls 
8 5 4 i  SFTkxx 
0.00 SF Long Wail 
85.47 SF Ceiling 413.47 SF Walls &. Ceihg  
9.50 SY FlwMg 41 .XI LF Flwr Yenmetcr 
0.00 SFSborI Wall 41 .W L.F Ceil. Perimeter 
DESCRIPTION ~m UNIT TOTAL 
.- . ... 
Wnta esuactitm Gum flax 
LiH curpr( fur wing 
T u r  our wer wrpa pad and bag for dispusal 
Apply anti-midial ap11 
C w t  pad 
La!.csistingcypet - l rh r  im!v 
Clrandriaxkuizcuupl 
Dr)'inp fan @a day) - No mwitaing 
I Drying ran for 3 day 
B a l m a d  - Mach and resit 
Dcur t h p  (jamb & casing) - JTtu3G'widc - S&I ~ s d c  
Rlrwn Total.: bedroom 2 388.a 
Rurm: bdrm 2 elst 
138.157 SF Walls 
ld.08 SF klmr 
0.00 SF Luog Wail 
14.m SFCeikg 
1.56 SY nmring 
0.03 SFShort Wail 
132.75 SF Walls & Celiing 
17.33 LF nwr Perimasr 
17.33 LF Ccil. Pairnet= 
DESCRIPTION Qm UNlT TOTAL 
.. . . . . . - . - - -. - .. - . . - -, -
Wacw extrwti~\11 Gum floor 
Ldt ctupet for dqing 
Tear nut wcl carpel p;rd mil bag fur dq%d 
Apply nnti-microbial agent 
. . 
ARMSTRONG-? 
CONTINUED - bdrm 2 ctrr 
O m  WNlT TOTAL 
I+ eusrinp +T - labar onir 
Clem ;vld ~ ~ r i z e  q c l  
B&ad - ktacb  and reset 
- - 
Room T& bdrm 2 dst 48.60 
R a w :  laundry 
349.33 SF Walls f 16.92 SF Ceiliog JGG.2G SF Walls & Cdling 
, ll6.?2 SFRuor 12.99 SYFlmring 43.67 LF F'iwa P a i m c t ~  
000 SF Lmg W d  0.M) SF Short Wan 43.67 L F C d l P c b d e t  
DESCRIPTION Q N l Y  UNlT TOTAL 
- .- 
R a w  Toralr-. Isuodry 91.01 
ServiceiMasteriMerry Maids 
l?2 l Duncan DL 
Carwd'Aiore. ID 83815 
(208)*,6i4633 (509)-927-Q4lfi Fax (20Rfl67-4746 
'Inx D i( 824503853 
DESCRlPTiON Qm UNIT TOTAL . . 
Wara cu~ncsioo fivm Uwr 
Appb and-microbial agmt 
mini fan (prr day) - No monitorke 
I Drying fan fur I day 
DESCRlFTION Qmy UNiT TOTAL 
Senice CaU 
If& ddcbris - p? pickup mck load - including chunp f s ~  
DESCBlPnON Qm UNlT TOTAL . -. . . . - - .... . . . .. - - .. 
Clean & deoclorirn moiimrp or box apriog - nvin 1.0OE.4 18.GI 28.61 
Clnm lvvselrt - pluin fubric 3.M) LF Li.41 87.111; 
ServiccMasterDferry Maids 
~ 9 2 1  hincan Dr. 
CclcurdAlenr. ID 83815 
(208)&7.fA.i3 (559)-927-44iG Fe i208)Wji-JifG 
CONTINUED - Perrunal Property 
DESCRlPIlON 
. .. Qm' UNIT TOTAL 
Clcan sofa 7.130 LF IG.58 1 i G O G  
- ... 
Rmm Totab: Persond Pnrpcrty - .. UI .72  -. . .. 




LiDe itcm Tot&: ARMSTRONG3 .f.UZl.')-l 
Grand Total Areas: 
3.552.00 3: Wnlls 1D.78 SFCeiiing 4.778.78 SF WaUs & Ceiling 
1.32678 SFRou 136.31 SYR&g U.(X1 LFRmPcrimcta 
0.00 SF b u r  Wall 0.M SF .%ai WaU W.M LFCdl. Pcrimerer 
0.00 S u r f n ~  A m  000 N u m b  of S q ~ m s  0.00 Total Peiimerer Len$& 
0.00 Tuta) Ridge Lcngtb 0.m ~ ~ d n i p i m &  0.00 AruofFace I 
ServieeMasterlMerry Maids 
Summary for Water Damage 
Line itan 'Cad 4,031.94 
Mataid Salm Tax @ S.OD(Phs 685.75 34.20 
.- 
Subtolal 1,046.23 - 





Re: Carpet replacement 
Due to water damage 
Install new carpet over existing pad 
Thraughout basement Except bedrooms 
$1855.00 
Install new carpet over misting pad 
In bedrooms in basement 





208 1777-771 1 FAX 203i777-7722 
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EXHIBIT "3" 
INVENTORY OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE AND LOSSLDAMAGE 













King-size down comforter 
Twin-size down comforters 
Coffee table 
Oriental rug 























SCOTTY'S ELECTRIC CO. 
5319 Mt. Carroll St. 
Cowr d'Alcne, ID 83815 
(208) 676-8057 !.k LI7IIh 
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W F  
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S i g n a t u r e  o f  this rece ipt  a c k n o v h e d g e s  material Wed above has b e 9  r a a i v e d  a n d  inspected.  i:, . - _  .-.: ... ...... .: I .?:<+i' 
November 14,2003 
Nadonal Document Center 
P.0. Box 268994 
Okkhoma City, OK 73126.8994 
Brian and Glenda Armstrong 
3259 N. 14& St. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Re: Uaim Number: 1003763049 
Policy Number: 75-918280327 
Date of h s :  7/2/03 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong: 
This le tm is in response to rhe Proof of Loss you submitted. From our National Document Center, we received 
nor6cation of your document on November 7, 2003. 
Afcer reviewing your informarion, there is nothing I can see that changes the Facts of loss. Please review cbe 
letter to you dated October 2,2003. Without any discrepancies in the kccual information, Fire Insurance 
Exchange is unable to reverse irs original decision to dedine coverage for your loss. 
In summary, your policy provides coverage for water damage that is 1) sudden and acadental and 2) arises from 
a discharge from a plumbing, heating, air conditioning system, or a honsehoid appliance. Items thac are 
considered household appliances indude dishwashers, refrigerators and washing machines. Items not 
cdasidered household appliances include aquariums, waterbeds, flower pots, Christmas tree stands and stand- 
alone swimming pools. If your swimming pool hooked into your plumbing system, it would trigger coverage 
under your poliq. 
Prior to the dean up and repair of your damages, I am not aware of any detrimental reliance provided by 
anyone associated wirh Fire Insurance Exchange. Additionally, rhe fam of your loss were brought to my 
arrenuon by your agent several weeks prior to your decision to cum in chis claim. The information we provided 
through your agenr has not changed. With a w h e n  contract of insurance provided to you when your policy 
was issued, thac takes precedent over any lack of oral details provided by any representatives of Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 
If you have any questions, you are welcome m call me collect at (208) 376-9061 
Sincerely, 
Fire Insurance Exchan e 
VL 
Joel B-, GCA 
Field Claims Supervisor 
Boise & Coeur d'Alene Propeny 
G: David Nipp 
End: Lare= dated October 2" and September 17&, 2003 
8 
__.- . 
~atelc-.5-"i Exhi$& # 5 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ + c  h, 4 t--<.+'4-5 
Deponent gXTrv\Cka -S 
RepotTer \A% - _C _c_-- 
~ a e i 6  Reporting Corporation 
(xnn~ i?x.?17? F A X  (?fly) ?.?.7-713.7 
EXHIBIT 'aD" 
0 :7 0 
Brian Armstrong October 5, 2004 
Page 11 
the mortgage. 
Q. Do you recall what month that was? 
A. I don't. 
Q. And did you and your wife actually go to 
Mr. Nipp's office to meet with him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you recall you discussed at the 
time of that meeting? 
A. Coverages, liabilities, some what-ifs. 
Q. What kinds of what-ifs were referenced in 
the meeting if you recall? 
A. We spoke about the above ground pool where 
he just basically told us to make sure we had a 
locked fence, to put a fence around the house, which 
we had a six foot fence around the house which we 
had and kept it locked. 
Q. Do you recall what you asked him about the 
pool and coverages of and surrounding the pool? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Prior to the events of July 2, 2003, had 
you ever submitted any claim under any homeowners 
policy? 
A. One more time with the question. 
Q. Sure. Prior to the events of July 2, 
2003, had you ever submitted any claims under any 
Brian Annstrong October 5,2004 
Page 12 
1 homeowners policies? 
2 A. I don't recall. 
3 Q. What do you recall Mr. Nipp said about or 
4 in relation to the pool? 
5 A. It would be covered. 
6 Q . Did he say how? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you talk to him about different kinds 
of what-ifs in relation to the pool? The what-if I 
think was the phrase you used before. 
A. Worst case scenario. 
Q. What kind of worst case scenario did you 
talk to him about? 
A. I believe as we were leaving I just asked 
worst case scenario what if it leaked and it caused 
damage would we have coverage, and his response was 
sure. 
Q. Now as a result of that meeting was a 
policy of insurance issued? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you get a copy of that policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you read it over after you got it? 
A. No. 
Q. Now I asked your wife about the renewals 
Brtan Armstrong October 5,2004 
Page 15 
insurance discussion. 
Q. Was that a separate discussion from 
renewal of the homeowners policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But with respect to renewal of the 
homeowners policy did you do the meetings 'or did 
your wife, or did you both do the meetings each 
year? 
A. I don't think we had renewal meetings. 
Q. Was it just a conversation we want to keep 
going with the policy? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Was that by phone if you recall? 
A. Payment? 
Q. No, just to tell him you wanted to renew 
that policy or add anything to it. Were those by 
phone if you recall? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. When did you first learn there'd been a 
problem on July 2? 
A. I came home for lunch like I normally do 
and made myself lunch, was sitting down. The phone 
rang. It was my wife. She said how's the pool. I 
thought it was fine. Went and looked out the back 
window, and it had basically fallen apart or 
Brian Armstrong October 5,2004 
I I 
Page 
collapsed which got the memory, the sensories 
triggering. I thought some windows were open in the 
house where it smelled kind of fresh, fresh air, and 
pretty soon realized what the problem was. 
Q. This was a lunchtime conversation you had 
with your wife? 
A. Somewhere thereabouts 
Q. What happened next? 
A. I got off the phone with my wife, called 
Shelly, that was a short conversation, and did what 
I had to do to start cleaning up my house. 
Q . You said you called Shelly. What did you 
say to Shelly in that call? She's with Mr. Nipp's 
oif ice? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What did you say to Shelly if you recall? 
A. I told her that part of my pool ended up 
in my basement and part of it in the backyard, and 
she said sorry Brian, that's not covered, and that 
was the end of the conversation 
Q. Did she say how she knew it wasn't 
covered? 
A. No. 
Q. At that time did you ask to speak to Mr 
Nipp or just spoke to her? 
Bnan Armbong October 5,2004 
I asked to speak to Dave. 
Q. What did she say about Mr. Nipp coming to 
3 the phone? 
He was not available. 
Q. After that did you godownstairs and 
6 explore the extent of the damage? 
You bet I did. 
Q. Can you tell me what you saw when you went 
downstairs? 
11 good idea of what 2,000 gallons of water can do in a 
12 basement that's 1,500 square feet. 
Q. Was there still standing water in the 
basement at that time? 
Q. About how deep was the water at that time? 
One to two inches, three inches in spots. 
Q. After you went downstairs and looked at 
19 the extent of the damage what did you do next? 
2 0 A. Grabbed a wet vac, grabbed a phone book 
21 and the phone, went outside, started sucking up 
22 water, and made some phone calls for help. 
2 3 Q. Who did you call other than Mr. Nipp's 
2 4 off ice? 
2 5 A. I called Nipp's office back and asked 












Glenda Armstrong October 5,2004 
I don' t know. 
Q .  What do you recall of your initial visit 
in about 1999 with Mr. Nipp in order to acquire 
insurance? 
I wanted to know what the complete policy 
6 was and if we were to install a pool what was 
7 necessary. 
You discussed that with Mr. Nipp in 1999? 
When you purchased the house in 1999 was 
11 your plan to install a pool? 
Q. When you discussed this pool with Mr. Nipp 
14 did you discuss the configuration of the pool as 
15 either an above ground or in-ground pool? 
A. Above ground. 
Just for a time reference when did you 
18 install the pool at the property? 
We install it every spring. 
Q. When was the first time you installed it 
21 or set it up? 
I don' t know. 
Q. Do you remember what time of year in 1999 
24 you took possession of the property? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV- 03-9214 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, Brian and Glenda Armstrong, and submit this Memorandum 
In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
I. NATUKE OF CLAIM 
This case concerns the interpretation of a homeowner's insurance policy. Plaintiffs, 
Brian and Glenda Armstrong (the Armstrongs), insured their home through the Defendant, 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (Farmers). The Armstrongs' home was damaged on 
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July 2,2003 when their above-ground swimming pool suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed. 
The collapse caused thousands of gallons of water, as well as soil and debris, to flow into the 
Armstrongs' finished basement. Farmers denied coverage under the Armstrongs' policy. The 
Armstrongs contend that their policy provides for coverage and, by this motion, they seek 
partial summary judgment in the form of a declaration interpreting their policy and enforcing 
their right to coverage. 
11. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The Armstrongs purchased a "Protector Plus" homeowner's insurance policy 
number 91828-0327 (the "Policy") from Farmers' agent David Nipp. The Policy's stated 
coverage period was March 24,2003 to March 23,2004. A 8  D. Mnrfice, Ex. A. 
2. The Armstrongs discussed the Policy coverages with Farmer's agent at the 
time of purchasing the policy. Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong p. 11; Depo. Tr. Glenda 
Amstkongp. 9. 
3. The Annstrongs informed Farmer's agent that they had an above-ground 
swimming pool and that they wished to be covered for the swimming pool. Depo. Tr, Glenda 
Armstrongp. 9. 
4. Farmers' agent told the Armstrongs that damage from the pool would be 
covered under the Policy. Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrongp. 12, 11. 3-1 7. 
5. The Policy in Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage A - Dwelling provides 
coverage for "accidental direct physical loss to [the Armstrongs' dwelling] except as 
provided in Section I - Losses Not Insured." See, Policy, Ex. A to Af l  D. Marfice. 
6 .  The Policy in Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage A - Dwelling provides 
coverage for "the dwelling . . . on the residence premises used principally as your private 
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residence. . . . wall-to-wall carpeting attached to the dwelling is part of the dwelling." Id. 
7 .  The Policy in Section 1 - Losses Jnsured - Coverage C - Personal Property 
provides coverage for: 
Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of 
water or steam from within a plumbing, heating or 
air conditioning system, or from within a 
household appliance, but not for deterioration, rust, 
mold, wet or dry rot due to the presence of water 
over a period of time. 
Id. 
8. The Policy in Section I - Losses Not Insured - paragraph 2 excludes coverage 
for loss caused by water damage. Id. 
9. The Policy in Definitions defines water damage. The express definition does 
include damage caused by the sudden or accidental discharge of water from within a 
household appliance. Id. (See, also, footnote 1 herein.) 
10. The Policy in Section I -Losses Not Insured - states: 
"We do not insured for loss . . . caused. . . by: 
* * *  
a. wear and tear, marring, deterioration; 
b. mechanical breakdown; 
C. . . .  
If any of the perils listed in a-i above . . . cause water to escape suddenly 
and accidentally from a . . . household appliance, we cover loss not 
otherwise excluded to the dwelling . . . caused by water . . . " 
Id. 
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1 1. On July 2, 2003, the Armstrongs' home was damaged when their swimming 
pool suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed causing water to flood into their finished 
basement. Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, pp. 15-1 7. 
12. The release of water from the pool caused damage to the h s t r o n g s '  dwelling 
and its contents. Id., Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, p. 16, 11.12-20. Armstrongs immediately 
notified Famers of the loss. Id., 7 13. 
13. On September 17, 2003, Farmers wrote to the Armstrongs denying coverage. 
See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, Ex. 3. 
14. On October 2,2003, Farmers again wrote to the Armstrongs denying coverage 
for the loss. See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, Ex. 2. 
15. On October 24, 2003, the Armstrongs prepared and submitted a Sworn 
Statement in Proof of Loss to comply with Idaho Code $41-1839 and the policy. See, Depo. 
Tr. B. h-mstrong, Ex. 4. 
16. By letter dated November 14, 2003, Farmers again informed the h s t r o n g s  
that it was denying their claim. See, Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. 6. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(a) 
provides that a party, seeking to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, move for a summary judgment in that party's favor. Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent 
part that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." 
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"Whether language contained in an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law 
to be determined by the trial judge." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539,542, 
903 P.2d 128, 13 1 (Ct. App. 1995); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 138 
Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). "Where the policy language is clear and 
unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as a matter of law." Id. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Farmer's policy is unambiguous and covers the Armstrong's damages, alternatively, 
even if Farmer's policy is found to be ambiguous the Armstrongs are still covered for the 
losses at issue. 
A. The Armstrongs' Homeowner's Policy expressly provides coverage for loss 
caused by the sudden accidental discharge of water from a household appliance. 
(i) Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous coverage must be determined 
in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used. Nedrow v. Unigard Security Ins. 
Co., 132 Idaho 421, 423, 974 P.2d 67, 69 (1998); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 
232,235,912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty, 138 Idaho at 
541, 66 P.3d at 245. Under Farmers' Policy, coverage is expressly provided for personal 
property loss if caused by "sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water ... from 
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from a household appliance.. ." See, 
Afl  D. Mafice, Ex. A. Coverage C, 13. 
Under the dwelling loss portion of the Policy, Farmers purports to exclude "water 
damage." However, the Policy definition of the term "water damage" is such that the 
Armstrongs' loss does not fall within that exclusion.' Moreover, the Policy qualifies its 
1 The Policy, Defmitions states as follows: 
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"water damage" exclusion even further making it inoperable to deny coverage here where the 
loss occurred from a sudden deterioration or break down of the Armstrongs' pool. See, A$ 
D. Marfice, Ex. A., Section I - Losses Not Iwured, fi 13 ("lfany of the perils listed. . . cause 
water to escape suddenly and accidentally from a plumbing, heating, or air conditioning 
system or household appliance, we cover loss . . . to the dwelling caused by water . . . '9. 
(underline added) 
The only rationale offered by Farmers for denying the Armstrongs coverage was, 
"Your swimming pool is not part o fa  plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, nor is it 
... a household appliance. Therefore, our original decision to decline coverage will remain. " 
See, Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. C. This is an admission by Farmers that the Policy's blanket 
exclusion for "water damage" is inapplicable. In its October 2, 2003 denial letter, Farmers 
volunteered as much, stating: "Within the water damage exclusion, some coverage is given 
back.';~ee, Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. 2. 
(ii) Since loss caused by water which has escaped from an appliance is clearly not 
excluded and is expressly covered, the question becomes: Was the Armstrongs' pool an 
appliance under the terms of the policy? 
19. Water damage - means loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any of the following, 
whether occurring on or away from the residence premises; 
a. water from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, overflow or escape of a body of 
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind; 
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains; 
c. water which escapes from any system designed to drain water away from the dwelling or residence 
premises, including but not limited to roof gutters, downspouts, sump-pumps, sump-pump wells, leach 
fields, seepage pits, septic tanks or drainage channels; 
d. water below ground level whether occurring naturally or not, including water which exerts pressure on, 
or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, wall, foundation, swimming pool, or any portion 
of the residence premises. 
None of the above descriptions apply to the type of damage at issue in the Annstrongs' loss. While their loss was 
caused by water, it was not "water damage" as defmed in the Policy. 
08s 
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The ordinary, dictionary definition of the word "appliance" is: "An instrument or' 
device designed for a particular use." See, WEBSTERS, 9TH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1985). 
A swimming pool certainly fits that definition. The Idaho Code also provides persuasive 
authority on this point. Under the Property Condition Disclosure Act, the statutorily required 
Seller Property Disclosure Form contains the following language: 
4. All appliances and service systems included in the sale, 
(such as refrigeratorlfreezer, rangeloven, dishwasher, disposal, 
hoodtfan, central vacuum, microwave oven, trash compactor, 
smoke detectors, tv antennaidish, fireplacelwood stove, water 
heater, garage door opener,pooNhot tub, etc.). 
See, I.C. $55-2508 (emphasis added). If a poolhot tub is an "appliance" for purposes of a 
real estate vendor's statutorily mandated disclosure, why would a pool not be an "appliance" 
for purposes of the Policy? 
"Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. 
Brinkkan v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346,352,766 P.2d 1227,1233 (1988). In the absence of 
ambiguity, an insurance policy must be construed as any other contract and understood in its 
plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of 
the contract. Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793 
(1981); Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 101 Idaho 772, 776, 620 P.2d 1102, 
1106 (1980)." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 
"If the language of a policy is susceptible to only one meaning this meaning must be 
given effect." Mutual of Enumclaw ins. 128 Idaho at 236, 912 P.2d at 123. Under the plain 
meaning of the words used in the Farmers' Policy, the Armstrongs' swimming pool is a 
household appliance. 
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B. Even if the Policy is ambiguous, the Armstrongs are still entitled to coverage for' 
their loss. 
If the term "household appliance" used by Farmers in the insurance policy purchased 
by the Armstrongs is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation then, the term is 
ambiguous, as a matter of law. "[Wlhere there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract, 
special rules of construction apply to protect the insured." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 
Idaho 138, 142,627 P.2d 317, 321 (1981). Under these special rules, insurance policies are to 
be construed most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against 
the insurer. Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 
1985) citing Foremost Inc. v. Putzier, supra. 
Ambiguity exists only if a policy term is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation. Nedrow v. Unigard,, 132 Idaho at 422, 974 P.2d at 68. The term "household 
appliance" is not defined in Farmers' Policy (even though the term "water" is!) See, A 8  D. 
Marfice, Ex. A. After the loss, Farmers sought to arbitrarily limit the Policy by manufacturing 
a self-serving definition of a plain policy term. Writing to the Armstrongs, Farmers stated: 
"Items not considered household appliances include aquariums, waterbeds, 
flower pots, Christmas tree stands and stand alone swimming pools." 
See, Depo. Tr. G. Armstvong, Ex. 5. Where this comes from is a mystery. It is 
certainly not from the Policy. 
The Court in Foremost held that where two different meanings can be applied to a 
term in a contract and one affords coverage and the other does not, the term should be given 
the meaning that provides for coverage. Id. "If a reasonable person under the circumstances 
would have believed they had coverage under the language of the contract then the test is 
satisfied." Id. The Court must construe the provisions of a policy consistently with what a 
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reasonable person in the insured's position would have understood the policy language to 
mean. Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, 127 Idaho at 542. While Farmers may not consider a 
swimming pool to be an appliance, the Armstrongs do. Moreover, as discussed above, the 
Armstrongs are not unreasonable in defining a pool as an appliance. 
In this case the Armstrongs reasonably believed the language in the Policy gave them 
coverage for their pool. This was because (1) Farmers' agent told them so and (2) the Policy 
expressly covers for sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water from a "household 
appliance." In the absence of a contractual definition of the term household appliance, a 
swimming pool falls within the reasonable interpietation of that term. In ordinary usage, an 
"appliance" is "a device or instrument designed to perform a specific function." See, THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4Ih ed. 2000). A pool is a 
device that provides for the specific function of aquatic exercise and entertainment. As 
mentioned above the Idaho Property Disclosure Act includes a pool in its litany of an 
appliances. If the meaning of the term "appliance" includes a swimming pool, then the 
Armstrongs are entitled to coverage for loss and damage proximately caused by the "sudden 
and accidental discharge or overflow of water . . . from . . . a swimming pool." 
Parties to a contract are free to insure exaclness by defining words used in the 
contract. Porter v. Farmers Insurance Co., 102 Idaho 132,627 P.2d 31 1 (1981). If Farmers 
did not want this type of loss to be covered, it could have expressly excluded it, or it could 
have clearly defined "household appliance" as the term is used in the context of its Policy. It 
did not do either and it cannot now "create" a coverage exclusion where one does not exist. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Farmers policy is not ambiguous as to the meaning of the word "appliance." The 
0 8 ti 
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plain meaning of the term "appliance" includes a swimming pool. The Armstrongs are 
covered under their homeowner's Policy. However, even if the Court were to find that the 
term "appliance" is ambiguous the Armstrongs are still covered. Idaho law is clear: Where 
two different meanings can be applied to a term in an insurance contract and one meaning 
will afford coverage whereas the other does not, then the term should be given the meaning 
that provides for coverage. Foremost v. Putzier, supra; Shields v. Hiram, 92 Idaho 423,427, 
444 P.2d 38, 43 (1968). The Armstrongs are entitled to partial summary judgment in the 
form of a declaratory judgment that they are covered under their Farmers Insurance Policy. 
DATED this r-/fiday of January 2005. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
BY /- 5 . 7 % 3 . ? / z ?  
~ o u ~ l a s $ .  Marfice, &he Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the y E d a y  of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
PO Box E -/Hand Delivered 
Coeur dYAlene ID 83816-0328 - Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
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Page Y of the Policy Endorserncnt Amending Section I 
Losses Not lnsured - 
the endorsement itinguige, which 
pmvidcs: 
Acts or omissions of persons or aggravate water damage. 
ss or combine with acts or 
0s IDAHO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSlTiON 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan -18 -05  'rS:40; Page 7 
curs, the resulting 
separate structures caused by 
water damage resulting ns of the roof or roof gutters. 
2. loss or damage to the parate structures, 
ware structures 
structures first 
sustain loss or dumug 
3. dirccl loss to the 
if caused by fire or 
Thus, Section I - and personal property. The 
section statw that the Po scd directly or indirectly by, 
water damage. 
, Coverage C - Personal Propcay, 
Piuitgraph 13, covers chi , even if the Court so finds, 
the coverage. for Dwelling and Sipa nL {rum the coverage for Personal 
Property. The coverage erry Coverages, Coverage 
h -Dwelling. That cove g" whicbincludes, for example. wall- 
to-wall carpeting. 
19 of that section that the term "waLer 
dmngc", for purposes verllow or escape of s body of wuter. 
MOTION FOR PAQTUL SUMMARY 
By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208  664  6338; J a n - 1 8 - 0 5  1E:40;  Page  8 
As to the personal prop irhin endorsemen1 H6104 also must 
rcfcrcnce the definition 
ragc for this loss under Coverage C - 
which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
described in Covcragc C, but 
watcr or s t e m  from within 3 
ithin a household appliance, 
nce of water over 
u peric>d of tiine ... 
cragc for pcrsnnul pmperty, docs not. 
epool, which srored water within the 
section of the contract is "household 
appliance." 
chnical terms are given their ordinary 
not by its ordinary usage 
reference to Idaho Codc F: 55-2508. 
This DefenQnt submits that i t  is in ference to the outside statute for 
rcncc; incorporate by reference the 
-2501, er seq. In order Fur Lht: cuurl 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF IDAHO'S BRIEF IN 0 
MOTION FOK PARTIAL 
: By: P A I N E  HAMQLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; J a n - 1 8 - 0 5  16:41; P a g e  9 
to utilize that statute, the court rnus cy. of insurance, as a matter of law, 
is ilmbiguous. TheDefenh t  sub guuus, aposition taken by Plainriffs 
in their argument. 
The Plaintiffs makc re pliance as "an instrument or device 
dcsigned for particular use." ary (1985). This Defendailt submits 
that the proposed definition i e the referenced tenn is "household 
appliance." Moreover, court 
fendant submits that 
~ h c  definition applied is neii 
detinirion proposed does not manner asserred by the Plaintiffs. 
The term "appliance' llegiate Dictiortary as follows: 
ipment for adapting a tool or 
e to time, including interpretations 
spccific to insurance coverages. 
d in operating it, and is to be 
verything of which anything 
end. Roberts v. City of Los 
nce" is a mechanical device, 
Alahama 440.85 Southern 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SIlMMARY 
: By :  PA INE  HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan-18-05 f6:4t ;  Page 
. 323 (S.Ct. Cat. 1936), the plaintin- 
d on certain lots for street lighting 
purposes. 
definition OF the term "appliance." 
There, rhe coun starcd: 
s to an end. (Webszer's New 
Tn the defined case of uthern 749, the dispute was over the 
css in connection with !:he illegal 
rhar thestate's sulhorily wlaxcd 
prohibired liquors orbeverages. 
One Black Mule v .  Stare, supra, Page 
Id that it an automobile, under 
"applionccs" includes ihinga 
ng supplied to the derendant 
e subject of the lawsuit, and 
s to an end; therefore, an appliance. 
DEFWDANT FARMERS 
OK IDAi'IO'S BRIEF IN 0 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
t B y :  
I 
I 
P A I N E  HAMBLEN COA; 208 664 6338; Jan-18-05 16:41 ; Page 
0 Southern Zd. 34 (Dis. Ct. App. FL, 
1992). rhs insured brought suit for w e decision does not quote the policy 
what similarro the Policy a1 issuc in 
rhis case. The court stated: 
the insured. The insurance 
f water ... kom within a 
household appliance." 
The insured's waterhed appamn tilled and caused water damuge. The 
question at had  was whether the wate appliance" and whether the rllirnagc 
was lhus covered by the policy. 
court overturned. the decision. The 
appellate- coun srated: 
a "household appliance" 
common understunding, n 
ork or pcrforms a tmk, such 
Murruy v. Royal Indemniry 
pliance' i s  'a tl~iiig u ~ e d  
as a means to an end.') 
policy definition and therc was no 
coveragc. 
DEFEh'DANT FARMERS 
t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208  664 6338;  J a n - 1 8 - 0 5  !6:42; Page 1 2  
Under the language of thi defined swimming pool was not a 
household appliance, as t.hat term lain meaning of the tern. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' use o irh the covemgc claims undcr 
the Policy, as Plaintiffs assert, to 
THE APPL~CATION o OR ACCIDENTAL 
DISCHARGE OF WATER IANCE WOULD ONLY 
APPLY TO COVERAGE C - D NOT COVERAGE A - 
A s  noted above, the Plai appropriate affidavit to define l h e i ~  
loss and the basis of ~heirmonct ffs appear to argue that the condi tion 
of suddcn accidental discharg would relate to ail or their 
losses; however, such is not guage of the Policy. The 
reference to sudden and. tic a household appliance is  within 
Paragraph 13, which relates . Plaintiffs havc failed to 
establish, by  appropriate y had wluch would be wirhin this 
coverage. The Policy wou I - to -d l  carperin&" if a 
claimed loss, are pan of rh gc A - Dwcllin&. 
The Policy provisions within S sured, and specifictllly water damage 
rclntcd to thc dwelling, i , which specified that there is no 
coverage for water ciamag 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF IDAHO'S BRIEF lR 0 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 3 
: By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; Page 13 
As defined by the Policy, Plainti occasioned by water leekage From a 
household appliance would not apply t i  ntiffs' claim, even if i t did apply to 
the swimming pool collapse. 
Undcr the terms of the Policy, th~ 
the dwelling, Coverage B for the separa 
overages. Those are Coveragc A for 
ge C for rhe personal property. 
The term "water damage" is d In fact, in rekrzmce to Paragraph 
19D of thc Policy, thc Policy thcrc sp a '‘swimming pool." Therefore, 
it is not proper to define that the Poli rence a household appliance as 
a swimming pool, and vice verfia, since pa~~iculatly used at least in, one 
place in the Policy. 
LJvJrrder Section I - Properly. s, coverages for the dwelling 
and separale structure are defined gr, C fur personal property. 
The reference to which Plaintiff$ bpliance is under thc sectinn 'Znsses 
insured - Covcrage C - Personal Propcit 
dwelling or separate structures. The: s 
. , 
l ~ g u s g c :  "We insure for accidental did 
eu not, therefole, apply to cither the 
Personal Property begins with thc 
ropexty described in Coverage C, but 
otion, or this lawsuit, a loss as n result 
to the loss n l s t ~ d  tho dwclling or 
only if caused by one or more of the fdli 
' .  i 
Therefore, ID the extent that Plaid 
i 
. ' !  
of water from a '"household . .. 
the separate struclures. :d 
DEFENDANT FARMERS INSURANCE C 
t By: PAINE  HAMBLEN CDA; Jan-18-05 i6:4z;  Page 
Moreover, undcr Scction 1 - all three coverages, by endorsement. 
the Poiioy specifics1 loss not insured: "..whenever waler 
darnqe occurs, The howcvcr causcd; GZOCPL wc 
do cover..," 
overage in the event of a 
that, especially since the 
hing to the contrary, by the specific 
langusge of tho endorsement. 
THE TERM "HOUSEHOLD T CREATE AN AMR'IGUITY 
by laymen in daily usage. 
create an amb'iguity. 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF IDAIIO'S BRIEF IN '0 
MOTION FOR PAETUL 
C B y :  t ' A l N t  HAMBLtN CUA; 208 664 6338; Jan -18 -05  16:43; Page 
the English Language, 4''' Edition. 
2000, defines applianc uspeciFc function, =specially 
an electrical device, such as a toaster, nced definition defines, as a 
synonym for the word 
s s commcm tcrm utilized by 
laypersons with an include a swimming pclr,l. 
Plaintiffs intend to nce it is used for the speciric 
a reference lu Lwo separate 
referenccs. This 
word references 
rcfcrcnce specific items such as "dish 
Plaintiffs assert that thcrc arc for the term "household uppliancc." 
is  whether the term i s  in~crpreted to 
y believed that Ulc tcrm "qplianco" 
there is no proof before lhis Coun to 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF IDAIiO'S BRIEF IN 0 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan-16-05 16:43; Page 
s do nor contain any language to 
asonablc oxpcctation of coverage. 
05,600 P.2d. 1387 (S.Ct. 1979). the 
able expectations. As to policies of 
Intent is robe dctermined fro t itself and 'in the absence 
of ambiguity, contracts for ins d ns any othcr and understood 
in their plain, ordinary, and p the meaning derived from the 
, 134 Idaho 302, 1 P.3d. 803 (S.CI. 
sonahle expectations. These, the 
[The p1aintil'I-j invites this and adopi rhc doctrine of 
reasonable expectations. T further contract analysis as 
in  New York. We dcclinc 
lc cxpectations doctrine in 
favor of traditional mles of v. Highlands Insurunce 
1 (1979). The traditional 
N ~ G S  of contract construction creating a new conrraot 
nable expecrations. K.C., 100 
DEFENDANT FARMERS INSURANCE 
O R  IDAHO'S BRIEF IN ORROSXTIOM 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY J 
t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan-38-09 16:44; Page 
As notedabove, the Plainti a: that they had any personal 
expectations with respect to &fin 
This Defendant has sub id Nipp, with respect to asscrted 
conversations. Mr: Nipp, by his agent or employee of this 
Defendant. Rather, he is an inde d insurance ugenl. hk. Nipp further 
states that there was no convers 
With respect to the qu aho courts have not held that if a 
reasonable person would expect cover h would be the adoption ol' 
the reasonable expeclstion do tcd that where a policy mily be 
ambiguous, which a question an ambiguous contract, lhe tlicr 
of fact must determine what the language to mean and thc 
words used must be constru ark v. hitdentis1 P.rowflv and 
Casualty Insurance, 138 
Plaintifis strain appliance" with respect toporsond 
propem damage as a m  not exist either tn damagc 
to the dwelling, includi ith respect to damage to the 
personal property. 
DEFENDANT FARM 
OF IDAHO'S BRTRF 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
t B y :  PA INE  HAMBLEN COA; Jan-18-05.16:44; Page 
THE ASSERTED C NCE AGENT DOES NOT 
Plaintiffs Conte they purpurtedly had a 
conversation with David Nipp, an insu fcrcnce to the conversation does not 
create an undisputed e, under the policy of insurance. It is 
Plaintiffs' reference, p a g e  of their Brief, Lhal here was 
ty what wag the asserted "coverage" 
that they sooght, int ver, Mr. DavidNipp has, by affidavit, 
stilted that heis not a generd agent or e ance Company of Idaho. Mr. Nipp 
has stared that he i her disputes that there ever was a 
conversation as ass 
t as to conversation. Moreover, Lht: 
properly before this Court, what the 
extcnt of coverage was that was the re 
As reflected by the Plaintiffs' bmilbed herein, the Plaintiffs rcceived 
of anyone, following receipi of the 
uacr. From the Plilindffs' own 
ipp pn?cedwl their purchase of ~ h c  
By: PA INE  HAMBLEN COA; Jan-18-05  18 :44 ;  Page 
residential property in 1999. They until, allegedly. 2000. Thc cvcnts 
su&ounding ihis matter did not occu 
From the case authority, it is s allegcd c o m c n u  cannot add LO the 
language of the Policy, since the Id pressly declined to adopt the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations. lnte ed upon the language of the Policy 
according to the plain and ordin ss those terms a n  otherwise clefincd. 
declaratory judgment of coverage. 
PlaintifTs' Complaint does not tory relief. Plaintiffs ussen chat they 
want declaratory judgment that they olicy. Plainriffs fail to address the 
specifics of the Pulicy. ~ h t  P Ic language between the dwelling and 
personal property. Under a s y, there was no coverage for damage 
to thc dwelling, or items defi 
not a swimrxting pool is a ordinary meaning of that phrase. 
consistant with dictionary ects that a swimming pool i s  not a 
household appliance. Furth definition wcn: applied to the Policy, 
rhe reference to household 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF IDAHO'S BRIEF XN 0 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan-18-05 '9:45; Page 20 
The Plaintiffs have urtaMotion for SumrnaryJudgment 
supported by particulariz 
other assertion they may have. 
canstruction proposed b 
DATED \6*. 
Defendant Fanlers Insurance 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OB' IDAHO'S BRIEF IN 0 
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2004: speci tical l y at 
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.d; 
of occupations or W: 
: , 
A. just in thj 
i 
Q. J U S ~  rece: q
, , 
A. Teaching .;:I 
I j 
Q. And how lo( 
: i 
i 
school district? . . !  , 
' 2 
A .  Five  
: j 
Q. Have you iq 
: i 
industry at all? ! . . . ,
1 
. : i . . 
A No. , !8 
. . I  
Q. Ms. ~rrnst id , , 
: 1 
husband purchase thd 
: j . , 
A. ' 9 9 .  : ' 1 , 
And a f t  
remodel the home? : : ' I  1 
, 
A .  yes. ! ' I  
: .  1 
Q .  When did.'& 
, :  I 
year would be f ine.i:/ 
. . i  
A. ~ o m ~ l e t i d r i  . , :  
: I 
Q - A n d  who d44 
, . I  
A. ~y husband1 . . ,  
t 
Q. A n d ~ h a t . : ~ /  
that particular BrO. 
; . I  I 
A .  The entir*] t , 
: ' I  I 
basement. . . I :  
Jan-18-05 -36:51; Page 39/53 
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Arriwtrong , 




, . !  , . 
i 
1 Q. Now when 
2 the basement unfurxiil 
3 A. Unfinisheq 
5 husband did any 
6 ever done; is 
, 
7 A .  Yes. 
9 you'd corn~leted the 
10 used for f o r  examp14 
11 A .  There are  1  t
12 bathroom, and an und 
( 1 4  basbrnent when YOU cdrfi 
17' basement today? 
3.8 A. yes .  
19 Q When 
1 2 0  d i d  you f i r s t  acqbii ;dl 
8 ; Jan.18-05 16:51; Page 40/53 
2 2 A .  When we 
2 3 Q .  And who 
. . . 
2 4 house? 
2 5 A. David N i p Q  
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PATRICK E. MTLLER 
Attorney at Law 
701 Front Avenue, Suire 101 
P.O. Box E 
Cocur d' Alcno, ID 83816-0328 
Telephone: (308) 66.1-81 15 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
ISBA# 1771. 
CLERI< DISTRICT COURT I 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF TKE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRTCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF K00'I'ENAT 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 1 
ARMSTRONG, husband und wife, ) Case No CV-03-9214 
) 
Pliunriffs, 1 
) IIIEFENIIAN'S FARMERS INSURANCE 
YE. ) COMPANY OF IDAHO'S OBJECTTON 
) TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
FARMBRS [NSURANCE COWANY OF ) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGIkEm 
TDAHO. an ldaho corpo~ation; CORPORATE ) 
DOES I-X. whose true names are imknown, ) 
1 
Dcfcndants. 1 
COMES NOW, tha Defendant Pmmsrs insurance Company OF Idaho, and objects tu the 
Plainriffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,pursu;mt toRule 56(c),I.R.C.P..uponrhegrounds 
 hat Plaintiffs failed to serve the Xlbtiori upon this Defendant, as required by Kule 56(c) and Rulc 
7(h)Ci), I.R.C.P. 
Lllr'PENDANT FARMERS XNSURANCE COB4P.ANY OF IDAHO'S 
OR9ECTION TO PtAINTIRFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SlJMMARY JIlDGMENT - 1 
t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA; 208 664 6338; Jan-18-05 17:06; Page 313 
This Derendant requests oral argumcnr 
h 
DATED .@?.day oE 
Attorney fur Defendant Farmem h~sumlce 
Company of Idaho 
CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of 3%, ZOOS, T caused to hc 
served a rruc nndcorxect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated bdlow, and addi'essed to the 
following: 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons 
61 8 North 4"' Strect 
P.Q. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816- 1336 
LEll U.S. MAE - .  
- HAND DELIVERED 
0 - OVERNIGHT MW 
$@ TELECOPY (FAX) to: 6 
DEFENDANT FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDNIO'S 
ORJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
MICKAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619 
APRIL M. LJNSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
61 8 North 41h Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur dlAIene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FBST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. . 
FARMERS JNSLJRANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV- 03-9214 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. 
W I C E  IN SUPPORT OF EX 
PARTE MOTION TO SHORTEN 
TIME 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Douglas S. Marfice, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1 .  I am an attorney for the Plaictiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth in this affidavit. 
2. I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. 
3. On or about December 8, 2004, my office spoke with Judge Hosack's 
and reserved the hearing time of 3.30 p.m. on February 1,2005 to hear Plaintiffs Motion For. 
Partial Summary Judgment. The availability of counsel for Defendant was also confirmed at 
that time. 
4. Counsel for Defendants was timely served with a Notice of Hearing, 
Memorandum In Support and Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice In Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on January 4,2005. 
5. Through an oversight, Affiant neglected to file and serve a separate document 
"Motion For Summary Judgment" althoug3 the grounds, applicable civil rules and time and 
place of hearing were all adequately set forth in the documents referenced in paragraph 4 
above. 
6. Defendants' counsel did not notify me until service of the Defendants' response 
brief of this oversight. Defendants have however filed an objection to Plaintiffs' motion, but 
have not articulated any prejudice resulting therefrom. 
7. In the interests of justice and judicial economy, Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment should be deemed properly and timely filed so as to permit hearing as 
scheduled on February 1,2005. 
\\\\\\lllrlrr/l/// \*\ 0. DeC 8 ,* \?.;G;;.sc&TIBR YOUR AFFIANT SAYFTH NOT. 
CZ\II. .toa(B * k + 
.* * 5 
-. .  :*: 2 :*2 = . 2009 : = s - .; =A 9.: i %+..:"oB~ .....coLff?;i\~ $ C C C A  Xc*-/ 
/ OIerY pup,& Douglas i?f Marfice 
+'~~fl l l l l l l , \ \ \ \ \~ 
@@-FD ..... 80. .  AND SWORN to me before this && of January 2005. 
.$9\.:$"03 /e;.,9 % s :-6 .,= s 
: 6002 . 2 - 
rr: * z :+g = .m - . % AoN ,.$; 2 
oo*., $ 3 o ~ ' ~ " ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ . "  \ ,\ Residing at Coeur d'Alene 
9 ',+ *..... 6% + + '/GO(, -0 \\\ MY Commission expires: / '  2 -6' C/ 
8//f//l11 ll\\,\\\\ 
 v .
L / C / 6 3  2 /- 
* 
A c n n n \ i r r  nc nnt lK1 A$ MARRCE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /.r'itay of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - /US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight 'Mail 
PO Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-0328 d a c s i r n i l e  (208) 664-6338 
Z3-d $q- 
Douglas a a r f i c e  
DOUGLAS S. M I C E ,  ISB #4072 
MICHAEL A. EAZY, ISB kt5619 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
61 8 North 4" Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-581 8 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Atromeys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs BRIAN and GLENDA ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, by 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
and through counsel of record, and hereby move this Court for an ex parte order shortening 
Case No. CV- 03-9214 
EX PARTE MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME FOR FILING 
OF "MOTION" 
time for hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. Hearing is scheduled to 
take place on Tuesday, February 1, 2005. That date was reserved for Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment well in advance, and availability of Farmer's counsel for that date was 
confirmed in advance. Plaintiffs' Memorandum and Affidavit In Support and Notice of Hearing 
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were timely served and filed, but Plaintiffs inadvertently failed to timely filefserve a separate 
motion paper as is customary. Farmers has objected to Plaintiffs' Motion, ostensibly on 
technicalfnotice grounds because there was no separate Motion filed with the Memorandum, 
Affidavit and Notice of Hearing. 
Rule 7 requ~res that an application to the Court for an order shall be made in writing 
stating the grounds and applicable civil rule. However, "The requirement of writing is fulfilled 
if the motion is stated in a written notice of hearing of the motion." See, IRCP 7(b)(l). Here, 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Hearing and Memorandum In Support which were timely filed and served 
(28 days prior to hearing) stated the groucds for the motion and the applicable civil rule. 
Accordingly, those filings fulfilled the requirements of Rule 56 and Rule 7(b). 
Nevertheless, to cure any technical defect in Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs hereby move, ex parte, for an order shortening time to permit Plaintiffs' 
filing bf a remedial "Motion For Summary Partial Judgment" document in strict conformity 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. This ex parte motion is supported by the Affidavit of 
Douglas S. Marfice filed herewith. 
DATED this &%lay of January 2005. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
BY , +,. 
Douglas 9. Marfice, Cff the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the  bay of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. JS Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
PO Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-0328 _IL Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
6 18 North 4th Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 8381 6-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-581 8 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. ' 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV- 03-9214 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SXJMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs B W  aid GLENDA MUvISTRONG, husband and wife, by 
and through counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
hereby move this Court for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of said Plaintiffs on the 
grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Court can rule as a matter of law 
that Plaintiffs are entitled to coverage under their homeowner's insurance policy for the loss 
and damage at issue here. 
This motion is further based on the documents and pleadings on file herein and upon' 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support and Affidavit was previously filed. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this &day of January 2005. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
By p - .5z%LL-- 
Douglas p ~ a r f i c e ,  o f  the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /Bay of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - AS Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 Overnight Mail 
PO Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328 - ,A'acsimile (208) 664-6338 
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
61 8 North 4" Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16- 1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
.I 
Case No. CV- 03-92 14 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
1. Facts claimed by Farmers to be disputed are immaterial. 
A. Even resolving all "questions of fact" raised by Farmers in Farmers' favor, the 
Armstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must still be granted. 
In a motion for summary judgment, it is the moving party's burden only to establish the 
lack of genuine issues of material fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 944 P.2d 
1360 (1997). A nonmoving party cannot create a genuine fact issue by simply listing facts that 
may be in dispute but that are not material to the motion. The nonmoving party must present 
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more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence to create a genuine fact issue. Sprinkler 
Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 697,85 P.3d 667, 673 (2004). 
In its response to Armstrongs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, Farmers puts forth a 
litany of issues upon which it maintains there are genuine factual disputes. Upon scrutiny, 
however, Farmers' disputed facts are all immaterial to the issue of law before the Court on this 
motion: to wit, Does Farmers' policy afford coverage for the Armstrongs' loss. 
(i) Facts relating to conversations with the insurance agent are immaterial. 
Farmers attempts to confuse the narrow issue raised by the Armstrongs' motion by 
raising superfluous factual disputes. Principal among these is Farmers' evidence regarding the 
insurance agent who sold Armstrongs their Policy. For purposes of this motion, the Court may 
accept Farmers' version of any conversation(s) between the Armstrongs and Farmers' 
insurance agent, David Nip. The Armstrongs testified they discussed coverage with Nipp. 
Nipp denies those discussions occurred. So be it. The narrow legal issue before the Court does 
not require reconciling this conflicting affidavitldeposition testimony. The Policy speaks for 
itself. It is clear and unambiguous. 
Whether or not Nipp told the Armstrongs anything need not be determined to interpret 
the Policy and to find coverage. Only if the Policy is found to be ambiguous, does Nipp's 
conversation with the Armstrongs become somewhat relevant and even in that event, 
who-said-what-to-who is not dispositive to the coverage question. Rather, it is merely 
evidence of the Armstrongs' reasonable understanding of the scope of their policy coverages. 
A factual question as to whether or not Nipp told the Armstrongs what they claim he told them 
would be material to whether or not the Armstrongs were abjectly unreasonable in believing 
that they were covered for losses related to their pool (and again, this is relevant only if the 
Policy is ambiguous). 
The Armstrongs are entitled to coverage under the Policy because the Policy does not 
- . .--- -.---M T ~ I  nooncmnhl TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 14C; i / 
clearly exclude loss for the type of damage they suffered. It is that simple. What their 
insurance agent did or did not tell them really does not matter in this analysis. 
(ii) The facts related to the Armstrongs' proof of loss are immaterial and irrelevant. 
The Armstrongs have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage, 
only. Deciding coverage bears no relationship to the issue of damages. Farmers' discussion of 
the Armstrongs' Proof of Loss is a red-herring that has nothing to do with coverage. Evidence 
of the Proof of Loss was only offered in the first instance to demonstrate the Annstrongs have 
conducted themselves under the belief that they had coverage, which in turn demonstrates the 
absence of an ambiguity in the Policy. If the Proof of Loss submitted with the h s t rongs '  
motion is objectionable, it can be ignored without impairing the Court's ability to determine 
coverage. 
(iii) The Armstrongs' understanding, interpretations and expectations under the 
Policy are immaterial. 
Farmers asserts that the Armstrongs' submissions "fail to establish undisputed material 
facts" in that "there are no affidavits or assertions as to how Plaintiffs interpreted the policy or 
what Plaintijs expected by the interpretation of the policy." See, Farmers' Brief in  
Opposition, p. 7. However, the Plaintiffs' expectations or interpretation of the Policy are 
irrelevant if the Policy is, as alleged in the motion, clear and unambiguous. As Farmers 
correctly points out, Idaho has declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations. K.C. 
v. Highland Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979). Accordingly, what the 
Armstrongs' expectations were under the Policy is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Policy 
is ambiguous. Again, the Policy speaks for itself. 
(iv) Farmers' "interpretation" of the Policy is immaterial. 
Farmers goes a step further in its effort to create a genuine fact issue by offering its own 
"interpretation" of the Policy. See, AjEdavit of Marti Gunderson. Just as the Armstrongs' 
"reading" of the Policy is irrelevant, so too is Gunderson's, or for that matter any one' else's; so 
long as the Policy is construed in compliance with law. To construe the Policy in compliance 
with law, the Court simply must determine that it is not ambiguous as to coverage for "sudden 
and accidental discharge ofwaterfrom a household appliance." That decision can be reached 
just by reading the Policy as written. The Court does not need help from the Armstrongs or 
Farmers (vis a vis Gundcrson) to do this. 
2. The predicate legal issue on this motion is whether the Policy is or is not 
ambiguous as to coverage for the Armstrongs' loss. 
"Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as 
a matter of law." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 542,903 P.2d 128, 131 
(Ct. App. 1995); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 
P.3d 242, 245 (2003). Here, the Farmers' policy is unambiguous but even if it were ambiguous, 
coverage would still exist, as a matter of law. 
A. 
excludes swimming pools is unconvincing . 
Is a swimming pool a household appliance? Apparently-it depends upon who you ask. 
The Idaho legislature clearly thinks so. See, LC. $55-2508. However, Farmers makes the bold 
assertion that the Court should not consider the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act to 
assist in determining the meaning of the term "appliance." It is the Court's prerogative to 
consider whatever authority it finds persuasive. Remember, if Farmers wanted a term in its 
policy to have a particular or limited meaning, all it had to do was define that term in the 
policy. It did so with the term "water," so it could have done so with "appliance." 
Farmers adds that the Property Condition Disclosure Act should not be considered 
because "the language of the Policy does noi, by reference, incorporate by reference the . . . 
Act." See, Farmers' Briefin Opposition, p. 14. But then Farmers turns around and cites to the 
definition of appliance in Black's Law Dictionary when the Policy does not reference or 
incorporate by reference this source either. Moreover, Defendant's own citation to Black's 
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(unabridged, revised 4" Edition) definition is far from persuasive because it lists numerous 
items that have or have not been considered to be an "appliance" in various jurisdictions.' The 
time to apply limiting definitions in a policy is when the policy is written, not after a claim 
arises. In short, Farmers offers no evidence, nor any compelling argument that a swimming 
pool is anything other than an appliance. 
Farmers cites a single Florida case which held that a waterbed was not an appliance. W. 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Lowrie, 600 S.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. F1. 1992). The Lowrie Court held that a 
waterbed is an item of furniture but offered no analysis or rationale whatsoever as to why 
something that is furniture cannot also be an appliance (See copy attached). Conversely, in 
another waterbed case, a New Jersey Court criticized Lowrie and offered a clear explanation. It 
stated that since a fixture can be an appliance, hrniture can also be an appliance (therefore the 
terms are not mutually exclusive and thus, waterbed is an appliance at least in New Jersey). See, 
Azze v. Hanover Ins. Co., 336N.J.Super. 630,644,765 A.2d 1093, 1102 (Super. CC. N.J. 2001). 
Drawing an apropos analogy which seems equally applicable to the facts of this case, the Azze 
Court went on to say: 
Second, waterbeds, like the one involved here, are generally purchased with 
heating units which plug into the household electric current like washing 
machines and dishwashers, appliances which also contain water. We draw an 
analogy to an electric blanket. Few people would consider a regular blanket to be 
an appliance. However, once one modifies a blanket so that it also provides heat 
electrically, this new item, an "electric blanket," suddenly takes on the 
characteristics of a household appliance. Note the certainly in the tone of the 
U.S. District Court in Remington Rancl, Inc, v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. 
Supp. 613,622 (E.D. Pa. 1956), when it proclaims that "A nonexhaustive list of 
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127(Revised 4th ed. 1968) Footnote to Appliance. "The term has been applied to a 
railroad track, Hines v. Kelley, Tex. Civ. App., 226 S.W. 493, 496; motor tracks in a coal mine, Jaggie v. Davis 
Colliery Co., 75 W.Va. 370, 84 S.E. 941; an automobile, Ross v. Tabor, 53 Cal.App. 605, 200 P. 971, 973; a 
telephone lineman's safety belt, Boone v. Lohr, 172 Iowa 440, 154 N.W. 591, 592; and a plank on which a 
painting foreman was working, Peterson v. Beck, 27 Cal.App. 571, 150 P. 788,789; but not, however to a station 
water tank, rope, or scaffold used thereon, by a painter, McFarland v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 177 Ky. 551, 
197 S.W. 944, 947; nor to a moving picture machine, Balcom v. Ellintuch & Yarfitz, 179 App. Div. 548, 166 
N.Y.S. 841, 842; nor the steps of a caboose, Cincinnatie, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 163 Ky. 42, 173 S.W. 
161, 162. 
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appliances are: Electric blankets, blenders, vacuum type coffee makers, hair 
dryers, fans, deep fat fiyers, m a n s ,  hand irons, food mixers, heating pads, com 
poppers, vaporizers, massage vibrators, waffle irons, and electric razors." We 
find that if a blanket becomes an appliance once it provides heat, so too does a 
waterbed. 
See, Azze v. Hnnover, 336 N.J. Super. at 644, 765 A. 2d at 11 02 (2001). 
If containing water and being plugged "into the household electrical current like 
washing machines and dishwashers, appliances which also contain water" (Id. at 645) was 
enough to make the Azze water bed an appliance, the same considerations apply to the 
Armstrongs' pool. It too had a pump and filter which operated off of a household electric 
current. See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, p. 8, 11.3-14. 
B. Evidence of the meaning of a word can be considered without first determining 
that the word is ambiguous. 
Farmers' argument implies that unless the term "appliance" is first found to be 
ambiguous, the Court cannot consider outside evidence of the meaning of the word. This would 
only be true if Farmers had taken advantage of its right to define the term in the context of its 
Policy. Since it did not choose to do so, Farmers abdicates the right to complain about the 
source of definitions used by the Court in deciding (a) what an "appliance" is and (b) whether 
that term is ambiguous in the context of the Policy. 
While Farmers may parse the definition of "appliance" ad nauseam, after-the-fact, 
nothing changes the simple, uncontested reality that the Policy does not offer a definition, 
whereas the dictionary, common usage and analogous case law support Armstrongs' 
position that a pool is a household appliance. 
C. The fact that Farmers uses a specific term in one instance and a veneral term in 
another does not mean that the general term was meant at the exclusion of the 
specific term. 
Farmers would like the Court to believe that a swimming pool is not a "household 
appliance" without telling it what, precisely, a swimming pool is. If a swimming pool is not an 
appliance, then what is it? It is certainly not furniture. It may be a fixture. But, as we have seen, 
both a fixture and furniture can also be an appliance. See, Azze, supra. Farmers suggests that 
because the Policy refers to an "appliance" in one section and to a "swimming pool" in another, 
the terms must be mutually exclusive. This argument requires reading things into the Pohcy 
which simply are not there. The term "household appliance" is a general description which in 
ordinary usage includes such things as a swimming pool, refrigeratorlfreezer, rangeloven, 
dishwasher, disposal, hoodifan, central vacuum, microwave oven, trash compactor, smoke 
detectors, tv aritennddish, fireplacelwood stove, water heater, garage door opener, hot tub, etc. 
See, I. C. $55-2508. 
In the Policy, the term "swinlming pool" is only used in one place. That is in the section 
of the' Policy defining of the term "water damage" under the subsubsection describing" water 
below ground level . . . or [which] seeps or leaks through a building. . . foundation, swimming 
pool. . . " Clearly, below ground level seepage or leakage is not what this case is about. As 
more fully briefed elsewhere, the Armstrongs claim does not even involve "water damage" as 
that term is defined in the Policy. See, Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment, p. 3, Nos. 8-1 0. Instead, this case involves a claim arising from the 
"sudden, accidental discharge of water from a household appliance;" a type of loss which is 
both expressly covered & expressly excepted from exclusions to coverage, depending on 
which part of the Policy you look at. 
4. If the Court is unwilling to accept the Armstrongs' definition of "appliance" then 
it must find that the term is reasonably susceptible to varying interpretation; thus, 
it is ambiguous. - If the term is ambiguous; the Armstrongs are entitled to 
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Summary Judgment. 
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and therefore subject to liberal 
construction so as to benefit the insured. Azze, supra. Ambiguity exists if a policy term is 
subject to conflicting interpretation. Nedrow v. Unigard, 132 Idaho at 422,974 P.2d at 68. If 
the Court does not find as a matter of law that h s t r o n g s '  swimming pool was a "household 
appliance," it must, at the very least, conclude that the term is subject to conflicting 
interpretations. 
One interpretation is that a swimming pool is a household appliance; another 
interpretation is that a pool is something else. However, even if the term "household 
appliance" is ambiguous then the Armstrongs are entitled to a summary judgment on the 
issue of coverage. "[Wlhere there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract, special rules of 
construction apply to protect the insured." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142, 
627 6 2 d  317, 321 (1981). Under these special rules, insurance policies are to be construed 
most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against the insurer. 
Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1985) citing 
Foremost Inc. v. Putzier, supra. Insurers write the policies, and fairness suggests that 
insur* should receive the benefit of any ambiguities. Azze, supra at 644.(emphasis added) 
Applying the special rules of construction requires the Court to find coverage even if it 
determines the Policy is ambiguous. 
In this event, Farmers may escape liability to the Armstrongs for bad faith denial of 
benefits, but it does not avoid responsibility to pay Armstrongs the policy benefits owed. 
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DATED this a a y  of January 2005. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
BY aswl 0_ L , 
Douglas 9. Marfice, o f  the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifjr that on the aJday of January 2005,I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patick E. Miller, Esq. A S  Mail 
' 701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
PO Box E Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-0328 F a c s i m i l e  (208) 664-6338 
l 2 5 m P  
Douglas 3. Marfice ' 
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6 I8 North 4th Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JODICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. . 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUGLAS S. MARFICE 
1 
Douglas S. Marfice, having been fist duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
Case No. CV- 03-9214 
1. I am an attorney for the Plaintiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth in this affidavit. 
2. 1 make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto are true and accurate photocopies of the following: 
Exhibit " A  excerpts from the Deposition transcript of Brian Armstrong; 
Exhibit"J3": Azze v. Hnnover, 336 N.J. Super. at 644, 765 A. 2d at 1102 
(2001); 
Exhibit "C": W. Am. Irzs. Co. v. Lowrie, 600 S.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. F1. 1992). 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
d 3 , 2 g L -  
~ o u ~ l a d ~ .  Marfice / 
? 5%y of January 2005. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me before th s ___ 
&bb& otary Public for Idaho 
kesiding at Coeur dlAlene 
MY commission expires: /// 2 -0 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the &@ay of January 2005,I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. ,/US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
PO Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-0328 - Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Br~an Armstrong October 5,2004 
1 A. Yes. 
Page 8 
1 time that the pool failed? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Now the pool wasn't connected to the house 
4 was it? 
5 A. . Only through means of electricity. 
6 Q. Was there a pump that worked filtration 
7 for that? 
Q. Was that a separate little structure, or 
did it fit within the pool itself? 
A. Just outside the pool. 
















Q. Just a long extension cord to the house? 
A. No extension cord. It had a long cord to 
the pump, about a 20 foot cord probably. 
Q. And how big is the backyard for this 
residence? 
A. Large. It's a big backyard. I can't 
really give you a good dimension. 
Q. Does the backyard slope to, away from, or 
is it flat? To, away from the house, or is it flat? 
A. The backyard tapers away from the house. 
Where we set the pool I had to do some filling so 
EXHIBIT "6" 
Page 1 of 2 
600 So.2d 34, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Dl451 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Third District. 
WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, 
v. 
Carolyn LOWRIE, Appellee. 
No. 91-2975. 
June 9, 1992. 
Insured whose waterbed broke while being filled brought suit under homeowner's policy for water 
damage. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Edward S. Kiein, J., granted partial summary judgment on 
liability in favor of insured. Insurer appealed. The District Court of Appeal, CLx2.12, 3., held that: (1) 
waterbed was not "household appliance" under coverage provision of policy, and (2) leak from 
waterbed did not stem from plumbing system. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
West Headnotes 
KevCite Notes I9 
0.u Insurance 
~G=..217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
*&=217XVIfA) I n  Generai 
c-217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions 
6~217k2142 Water Damage 
, i.;217k2142(ll k. In  General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 217k417.5(1)) 
Waterbed was not "household appliance" under provision of homeowner's insurance policy providing 
coverage for accidental discharge or overflow of water since waterbed was item of furniture that did 
not work or perform task and, thus, no coverage existed for water damage resulting when bed broke 
while being filled. 
XevCite Notes i3.7 
6-r-217 Insurance 
,2;-217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
c=217XVI(Al I n  General 
:;-217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions 
;:..217k2142 Water Damage 
d:=217k2142(11 k. In  General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 217k417.5(1)) 
"Household appliance," under terms of homeowner's insurance policy providing coverage for 
accidental discharge for overflow of water, is household device that does work or performs task. 
KevCite Notes a 
~ k 2 1 7  - Insurance 
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'1.7~217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
1=217XVI(A) I n  General 
~:=217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions 
~:;:.;217k2142 Water Damage 
.:=2-61 k. Sewers and Drains; Plumbing. Most Cited-s 
(Formerly 217k417.5(1)) 
Leak caused when waterbed broke while being filled did not stem from "plumbing system" under 
coverage provision of homeowner's policy, even though waterbed was filled by means of plumbing 
system, since leak emanated from waterbed itself. 
*35 3ones and Zaifert and Tami R. Woife, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant. 
Marc L. Goldman, Miami, for appellee. 
Before COPE, LEW and GERSTEN, 31. 
COPE, Judge. 
Western American Insurance Company appeals a non-final order granting partial summary judgment 
on liability in favor of its insured, Carolyn Lowrie. We reverse. 
I9 L$=L The insurer issued a homeowner's insurance policy to the insured. The insurance policy 
included coverage for "[alccidental discharge or overflow of water ... from within a household 
appliance." The insured's waterbed broke while being filled, and caused water damage. The trial court 
ruled that the waterbed is a "household appliance" and that the insurer must cover the loss. 
m' In our view, a waterbed is an item of furniture, and is not a "househoid appliance" within the 
ordinary meaning of that phrase. In  the common understanding, a household appliance is a household 
device that does work or performs a task, such as a washer, dryer, vacuum cleaner, or toaster. Cf. 
Murray v. Rovai Indemnitv Co., 247 Iowa 1299, 78 N.W.2d 786. 787 0 ( "appliance" is "a thing 
used as a means to an end"). The waterbed was not within the policy definition and there is no 
coverage. 
ma The insured argues alternatively that the leak can be deemed to have stemmed from the 
plumbing system, discharges from which are also covered by the insurance policy. Although it  is true 
that the waterbed was filled by means of the plumbing system, it is undisputed that the leak 
emanated from the waterbed itself, which is not part of the plumbing system. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the insurer. 
Fla.App. 3 Dist.,1992. 
West American Ins. Co. v. Lowrie 
600 So.2d 34, 17 Fia. L. Weekly Dl451 
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H 
Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division. 
Joseph B. AZZE and Maureen P. h e ,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents, 
v. 
HANOVER INSURANCE CO., A Corporation of 
the State of New Hampshire, Defendant- 
RespondentfCross-Appellant. 
Submitted Dec. IS, 2000. 
Decided Jan. 30,2001. 
Insureds brought action against homeowners' 
insurer to recover for damage to personal property 
caused by bursti~g of waterbed. The Superior 
Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, entered 
summary judgment that the suit was time barred. 
Appeal and cross-appeal were taken. The Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, Wells, J.A.D., held that: 
(1) a matter of first impression, an 
electrically-heated waterbed was a "household 
appliance" within the meaning of the coverage for 
damage to personal property caused by the 
discharge or overflow of water from within a 
household appliance, and (2) a letter by the insurer 
did not halt the tolling of the one-year policy 
limitations period. 
Affmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Page 1 
and the time that the insurance company formally 
denies coverage, the limitations period in the policy 
is tolled. 
[3] Insurance -3564(8) 
217!d564(8) Most Cited Cases 
Letter by insurer could be a formal denial of 
coverage and could halt the tolling of the one-year 
policy limitations period, even though it lacked a 
statement regarding the limitations period or the 
need for legal counsel; the insurer denied the claim 
in good faith. 
[4] Insurance -3564(8) 
217k3564(8) Most Cited Cases 
Letter by homeowners' insurer denying coverage 
for personal property damaged by bursting of 
waterbed, but inviting additional information and 
providing address for ftling complaint with the 
Insurance Department, was not an unequivocal, 
formal denial and, therefore, did not halt the tolling 
of the one-year policy limitations period; the letter 
could reasonably lead a person to conclude that 
contact with the Department was actually a 
prerequisite to a lawsuit, and the insureds were still 
negotiating with the insurer on the dwelling claim. 
J5] Insurance @32142(1) 
21%?142(1) Most Cited Cases 
An electrically-heated waterbed was a "household 
appliance" within the meaning of a homeowners' 
insurance policy covering damage to personal 
property caused by the discharge or overnow of 
water &om within a household appliance; the bed 
could reasonably be considered a tool, instnunent, 
or device adapted for a particular purpose. 
West Headnotes [6] Insurance -1715 
[I] Insurance -3560 217k1715 Most Cited Cases 
217k3560 Most Cited Cases [6] Insurance -1829 
[I] Insurance -3564(4) 217kl829 Most Cited Cases 
217k3564(4) Most Cited Cases [6] Insurance -1831 
The six-year statute of limitations for a suit on a 217k1831 Most Cited Cases 
contract applies to insurance actions, but may be Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion and, 
shortened by the terms of an insurance contract. therefore, are subject to liberal construction so as to 
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. benefit the insured. 
[2] Insurance *3564(8) **lo94 *631 Chazkel & Associates, East 
217k3564(8) Most Cited Cases Brunswick, attorneys for 
Between the time the insured gives notice of loss appella&/cross-respondents (Michael Cbazkel, of 
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counsel, Jeffrey Zajac, on the brief). 
*632 Craig M. Terkowitz, Piscataway, attorney for 
respondent/aoss-appellant @erek A. Ondis, of 
counsel and on the brief). 
Before Judges NEWMAN, BRAITHWAITE and 
WELLS. 
This opinion of the court was delivered by 
WELLS, J.A.D. 
Plaintiffs Joseph and Maureen Azze appeal from 
summary judgment dismissing their claim against 
their homeowners carrier, defendant Hanover 
Insurance Co. The motion judge determined that the 
statute of limitations barred the Azzes' claim. 
Hanover cross-appeals from the judge's mlmg that 
an electrically-heated waterbed is a "household 
appliance" withim the meaning of the policy. We 
reverse the judgment dismissing the claim and 
a f f i  the determination with respect to the 
waterbed. 
**I095 The facts gleaned from the moving and 
opposing papers submitted to the motion judge are: 
In 1995, the Azzes purchased a homeowner's 
insurance policy from defendant, Hanover 
Insurance Company. The policy covered the time 
period between midnight, August 1, 1995, and 
midnight, August 1, 1996. The policy covered the 
following six types of loss: (A) Dwelling; (B) 
Other Strucbes; (C) Personal Property; @) Loss 
of Use; Q Personal Liability; and (F) Medical 
Payments to Others. The policy was accompanied 
by a "Homeowner's Policy Reference Guide," which 
explained the terms of the Azzes' insurance 
coverage. The reference guide made the following 
statement with regard to coverage for loss to 
personal properly: 
We insure for direct physical loss to the property 
described in Coverages A and C caused by a peril 
listed below unless the loss is excluded in Section 
I-- Exclusions. 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Windstom or hail. 
.... 
3. Explosion. 
4. Riot or civil commotion. 
Page 2. 
5. Aircraft, including self-propelied missiles 60m 
spacecraft 
6. Vehicles. 
*633 7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental 
damage from smoke. 
.... 
8. Vandalism or malicious mischief. 
9. Theft including attempted theft and loss of 
property from a known place when it is likeiy that 
the property has been stolen. . 
.... 
10. Falling objects 
11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes 
damage to the inside of a building or property 
.... 
12. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic tire protective sprinkler 
system or from within a household appliance. 
The "Defmitions" section of the homeowner's 
policy reference guide did not include a definition 
of the term "household appliance ." 
In addition, the reference guide contained the 
following clause: "8. Suit Against Us. No action 
can be brought unless the policy provisions have 
been complied with and the action is started within 
one year after the date of loss!' 
On August 15, 1995, in the Azzes' home, an 
electrically-heated king-sized waterbed burst during 
routine maintenance. This mishap sparked an 
extensive flood throughout the home. Because the 
walls and ceiling of the home were constructed 
from plaster, water filtered throughout the structure, 
resulting in substantial damage to both the home 
and much of its contents. 
Following this occurrence, the Azies retained an 
insurance 'adjuster to help them submit their claim 
to Hanover. They submitted both a stmcnual 
damage and a personal propern loss claim (covered 
as Loss Types "A" and "C" in the homeowner's 
policy, respectively). 
On September 6, 1995, Jay Vigneaux, a claims 
adjuster from Hanover, sent the Azzes a letter in 
response to their claim. The letter referred to an 
inspection that Mr. Vigneaux had performed on the 
:laim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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residence on August 18, 1995. Mr. Vigneaux 
informed the *634 Azzes that, in the opinion of 
Hanover, their homeowner's insurance covered the 
structural damage (coverage "A") that had occurred 
as a result of the waterbed accident, but not the 
personal propeny damage (coverage "C"). Mr. 
Vigneaux's letter pointed to the language in the 
policy, quoted above, which enumerated the twelve 
"named perils" covered by the coverage "C" 
property damage section of the policy. The letter 
stated: 
**I096 In refening to the above-named perils, 
please address number 12. "Accidental 
discharge or overflow of water or steam from 
within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or 
automatic fue protective sprinkler system or from 
within a household appliance." Our 
investigation, through the use of Property Loss 
Research Bureau, defines a waterbed as a means 
of supporting the body in a reclining position. 
Additionally, a waterbed is considered a 
container. It does not seem that the form writers 
intended or that the insured could reasonably 
expect that the term "household appliance" would 
Lmclude such containers. 
provide coverage for this portion of the claim. 
I 
Since Coverage C--Personal Property is named 
peril and there are no perils wltich include the 
bursting of a waterbed, we will be unable to 
In specifying these grounds for denial, we do not 
intend to waive, but rather specifically reserve all 
our rights under the contract of insurance 
including, but not limited to, other defenses 
which may be applicabIe to your claim. 
Additionally, we continue to require f i ~ U  and 
complete compliance with all terms and 
conditions of the policy. 
If you have any questions or further information 
which may become pertinent, please contact us so 
that we may consider it. 
Should you wish to take this matter up with the 
New Jersey State Insurance Department, you can 
write them at State of New Jersey Department of 
Insurance, Division of Enforcement and 
Consumer Protection, CN329, Trenton, New 
Jersey 08625-0329. 
The letter did not contain any information 
regarding the one-year statute of limitations, nor did 
it suggest that the Azzes should engage the services 
of an attorney if they were dissatisfied with the 
defendant's position. 
The Azzes took no further action regarding the 
personal property portion of their claim, focusing 
instead on performing the structural repairs 
necessary to collect payments fiom the defendant on 
their claim for damage to the home, under Coverage 
"A" of the policy. The Azzes state that these 
repain were completed in 1996, and Hanover paid 
for the structural repairs. 
*635 In January 1997, one year and three months 
from the date of Hanover's letter, the Azzes sent a 
letter to Hanover regarding the personal property 
loss claim. In that letter, they registered their 
objection to Hanover's position that an 
elechically-heated waterbed was not a "household 
appliance" within the meaning of the term as used 
in the policy, and requested reconsideration of that 
position. They contended in the letter that, since 
no definition of "household appliance" was given in 
the policy terms, an ambiguity therefore existed that 
must, by New Jersey law, be construed in favor of 
the insured. 
On January 30, 1997, Hanover replied, stating that 
"We will be standing fum behind our decision." 
This letter, tike its predecessor, did not suggest that 
the Azzes contact an attorney, nor did it aUude to 
the contractual one-year statute of l i tat ions.  
lo an attempt to have the personal property claim 
paid, the Azzes Mote to the New Jersey 
Department of Insurance, as had been suggested by 
Hanover in its fust letter of September 1995. The 
Department responded on August 8, 1997, noted 
that it was not in a position to act as an arbitrator in 
such a dispute, and suggested that the Azzes consult 
an attorney. 
On October 23, 1997, the Azzes filed a complaint 
seeking enforcement of insurance coverage under 
their homeowner's policy. Hanover answered on 
January 28,1998. 
In July 1999, Hanover fded a motion for summary 
judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations 
precluded the Azzes' claim. The Azzes cross-moved 
for summary judgment on August 10, 1999. 
' 
**1097 On August 20, 1999, oral argument on 
0 2005 Thomsoflest. No Claim to (?rig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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both motions was heard. The judge entered an 
order granting Hanover's motion for summary 
judgment and denying the Azzes' cross-motion. 
The court determined that the one year statute of 
limitations contained in the policy barred the Azzes' 
suit. However, the court also determined that, under 
the insurance policy in question, an electrically-*636 
heated waterbed could be considered an 
"appliance" for purposes of coverage. The present 
appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
[I] By its terms, the Hanover policy granted the 
Aves one year from the date of this loss in which to 
file suit against the insurer. In New Jersey, the 
same six-year statute of limitations that applies to 
contractual actions would ordinarily apply to 
insurance actions. Breen v. New Jersey 
Manufacturers Indemnity Ins. Co., 105 N.J.Super. 
302, 309, 252 A.2d 49 (Law Div.1969), @d 109 
NLSuper. 473, 263 A.2d 802 (App.Div.1970); 
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. However, that period may be 
shortened by the terms of an inswance contract. 
James v. Fed Ins. Co., 5 N.J! 21, 73 A.2d 720 
(1950). Therefore, as both parties agree, the 
contractual one-year statute of limitations found in 
the terms of the Azzes' insurance policy is binding 
on theni. 
What is at issue is whether the operation of the 
"equitable tolling doctrine" allows the plaintiff to 
bring this suit more than a year after the accrual of 
the personal property loss. 
According to Scott G. Johnson, The Suit Limitation 
Provision and the Equitable Tolling Doctrine, 30 
Tort & Is. L.J. 1015 (1995), suit limitation 
provisions such as the one in the plaintigs policy 
are commonly found in properly insurance policies. 
According to Johnson, 
Two divergent interpretations of suit limitation 
provisions have emerged. Some courts strictly 
interpret the suit limitation provision, holding that 
the limitation period begins to run on the date of 
loss. Other courts have recognized the principal 
of equitable tollimg. Under the most common 
tolling theory, the suit limitation period is tolled 
from the time the insured gives notice of the loss 
to the insurer until the insurer formally denies 
liability. The New Jersey Supreme Court first 
Page 4, 
recognized the equitable tolling doctrine in 
Peloso v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co . 
[Johnson, supra, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. at 1017.1 
In Peloso v. Harlford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 
267 A.2d 495 (1970), the Court determined that 
contractual limitation provisions should not be read 
literally, with the one-year period nuuting *637 
uninterrupted from the date of the loss. According 
to the Court, such a reading of these provisions 
would be unfair, because it would allow, in effect, a 
ticking away of the limitations period while the 
insurance company investigated the loss. Peloso 
stated that 
[TJhe fair resolution ... is to allow the period of 
limitation to run from the date of the casualtv but 
to toll it from the time an insured gives notice 
until liability is formally declined. In this 
manner, the literal language of the limitation is 
given effect; the insured is not penalized for the 
time consumed by the company while it pursues 
its contractual and statutory rights to have a proof 
of loss, call the insured in for examination, and 
consider what amount to pay; and the central 
idea of the limitation provision is preserved since 
an insured will have only 12 months to institute 
suit. 
[Peloso, 56 N.J. at 520,267 A.2d498.1 
[Z] From the passage above, it becomes evident 
that between the time the insured gives notice of 
loss and the time that the insurance company 
"formally denies coverage," the statutory period is 
tolled Peloso does not, however, speciircally 
declare what sort of denial of coverage by the 
insurer should be considered sufficiently "'"1098 
formal" to end the tolling period and restart the 
clock on the one-year period. 
The Azzes' argument rests upon the contention that 
the denial letter sent by defendant in September 
1995 did not meet the requirement for "formal" 
denial under Peloso, and that, therefore, the one 
year limitation should have been tolled fiom the 
date of the reporting of the loss, in August 1995, 
until January 1997, when the defendant 
unequivocally denied coverage. The motion judge 
found that "the language of the September 1995 
letter was unequivocal and clearly demonstrates a 
denial." 
[3] We disagree. We, however, reject the fxst 
Q 2005 ThomsoniWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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reason the Aves offer for reversal. They assert 
that the September1995 letter does not qualify as a 
formal denial because it does not conform to 
requirements set out under Bowler v. Fidelily di 
Casually Co. of New York, 53 N.3: 313, 250 A.2d 
580 (I 969). 
In Bowler, plaintiff held an accident insurance 
policy purchased from the defendant insurance 
company. The terms of the policy *638 dictated 
that in case the insured was totally disabled by an 
injury, the insurer would pay $50 per week, for up 
to 200 weeks. If, by the 200th week, the insured 
was found to be permanently and totally disabled, 
the insurer would pay $50 per week for an 
additional 600 weeks. 
In an accidental fall, plaintiff broke his leg, and 
subsequently developed a chronic infection, which 
resulted in total disability. The plaintiff submitted 
a claim to defendant, who paid $50 weekly, for 199 
weeks. The insurance company then did not pay 
the 200th week, fearing that a payment for that 
week would amount to an admission that the insured 
was now entitled to the 600 additional weeks for 
permanent disability. According to the Bowler 
Court, the insurance company, 
Instead of fuIfilIing its contractual obligations ... 
lapsed into silence, and not only failed to pay the 
200th week but ignored the practically conclusive 
proof of [plaintiffs] total and permanent 
disability ... [Playmeat of benefits was cut off 
without a word .... Plaintiffj, a layman obviously 
not versed in insurance law, took no legal action 
until ... he got into the hands of an attorney, and 
this suit was brought--more than six years after 
the end of the 200 week total disability period. 
When this was done, the insurer pleaded the 
six-year statute of limitations ... as a bar. We 
regmd such treatment of its policyholder as 
shocking and unconscionable. 
[ I d  at 326,250 A.2d 580.1 
The Court found that the defendant's actions 
constituted an "obvious breach of its duty of good 
faith and fairness in the handling of its contractual 
undertaking." Id. at 330, 250 A.2d 580. 
Consequently, the Court found that the defendant 
was estopped from raising the statute of limitations 
defense. Id at 337,250 A.2d 580. 
The Aves  point to the following language in 
Bowler which, they contend, mandates that certain 
requirements be fulfilled before an insurance 
company's denial letter will be considered to be a 
"hue" deniaI: 
[The insurance company] must notify the insured 
of its decision not to pay his claim. But mere 
naked rejection would not be sufficient. The 
giving of such notice should be accompanied by a 
full and fair statement of the reasons for its 
decision not to pay the benefits, and by a clear 
statement that if the insured wishes to enforce his 
claim it will be necessary for hi to obtain the 
services of an attorney and institute a court action 
within an appropriate time. The "appropriate 
*639 time" means the time remaining under the 
policy or the applicable statute of limitations 
within which the suit must be brought. Failure 
on the insurer's part to follow such a course, will 
bar reliance on the statute of limitations or a time 
restriction on court action expressed in the policy. 
[Id at 328,250 A.2d 580.1 
**I099 The Aves  assert that, because the denial 
letter sent in September 1995 lacked a statement 
regarding the limitations period or the need for legal 
counsel, the above passage in Bowler means that, as 
a matter of law, the 1995 letter cannot operate as a 
legal denial of coverage. This passage, taken out 
of context, might well lead one to believe that the 
Bowler Court did, in fact, announce a sweeping new 
requirement for a11 insurance company denials of 
claims. Hanover, however, argues for another 
reading of Bowler. It asserts that :the Bowler 
Court based [its] decision upon the breach of the 
duty of fair dealing. In a situation where there has 
been no breach of the duty, the reasoning behind the 
Bowler decision is not present." 
We agree with Hanover's analysis of Bowler. 
When that case is examined as a whole, it becomes 
clear that its application is not meant to be nearly as 
sweeping as the Azzes imply. Bowler dealt with a 
situation in which an insurance company, which had 
every reason to believe that it owed coverage to the 
insured, avoided its obligation to provide such 
coverage by literally dropping out of sight. The 
requirements for denial outlimed in the passage 
above are meant to remedy only that situation and 
others like it, where the insurer's duty of good faith 
1 Claim to 01%. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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and fair dealing are at issue. This becomes much 
more apparent when one puts the quoted passage 
into the context of the paragraphs that precede it. 
Stated the Court in those preced'mg paragraphs: 
In situations where a layman might give the 
controlling language of the policy a more 
restrictive interpretation than the insurer knows 
the courts have given it and as a result the 
uninformed insured might be inched to be 
quiescent about the disregard or non-payment of 
his claim and not to press it in a timely fashion, 
the company cannot ignore its obligation. It 
cannot hide behind the hsured's ignorance of the 
law; it cannot conceal its liability. In these 
circumstances it has the duty to speak and 
disclose, and. to act in accordance with its 
contractual undertaking. The slightest evidence 
of deception or overreaching will bar reliance 
upon time Limitations for prosecution of the 
claim. 
*640 More specifically, in a situation such as that 
present here, if all or part of the benefits provided 
by the policy clearly is due, the insurer must 
make the payment. If it fails to do so, and the 
statute of limitations or a policy limitation 
intewenes before suit is started, it will be 
estopped to plead the limitation in avoidance of a 
trial on the merits of the claim. Further i f  the 
insurir har factual information in its possession 
substantially supporting the policyholder's right 
to benefits, but it has a rearonable doubt as to 
whether the evidence is sufficient to require 
payment, the obligation to exercise good faith, 
upon which it knows or should know the insured 
is relying, cannot be satisfied by silence or 
inaction. were the passage quoted in plaintiffs 
brief beings.] 
[Id at 328,250 A.2d 580 (emphasis added).] 
Clearly, the shingent notification requirements in 
Bowler are meant to prevent an insurance company 
fiom disclosing the likelihood that it will be held 
liable, when such likelihood exists. 
Other sources reinforce our reading of Bowler. 
For example, William T. Barker and D o ~ a  3. 
Vobomik, The Scope of the Emerging Duly oj 
First-Party Insurers to Infom their Insureds qj 
Rights under the Policy, 25 Tort & Ins. L.J. 749 
(1990), analyzes Bowler as follows: 
Read broadly, [Bowler ] could suggest a duty to 
notify the claimant of many things, including the 
time period allowed for bringing suit, on every 
non-frivolous claim that an insurer declines to 
pay. But the New Jersey courts have not read it 
so. Indeed, there is hardly any case law citing 
Bowler for its statute of limitations holding and 
none relying on a failure of notice to preclude use 
of the statute of limitations. Thus, Bowler 
**I100 should be read to require notice only 
where the insurer has received evidence 
approximating a prima facie case of entitlement 
to benefits and, perhaps, only where the insurer is 
on notice (because of policy language that a 
layman is likely to misunderstand or otherwise) 
that notice is necessary for the insured to exercise 
available rights, including the right to deny the 
claim. 
[Id. at 753,250 A.2d 580.1 
Hanover's situation here is clearly distinguishable 
fiom the facts in Bowler. Hanover did not possess 
any information which substantially supported the 
Azzes' rights to recover for damages to personal 
property caused by a burst waterbed. Hanover's 
letter of September 1995 makes it plain that it knew 
that the cause of the property damage was the 
sudden release of water from the electrically-heated 
waterbed, and that it simply construed the policy to 
exclude waterbeds from the category of "household 
appliance." Hanover contends that its research 
only bolstered this analysis, an assertion not 
disputed by the Azzes. Furthermore, *641 the 
Azzes never contended that Hanover had any 
legitimate reason to believe that it was more likely 
than not that the Azzes would prevail at trial in an 
argument that an electric waterbed is a "household 
appliance." Therefore the good faith of Hanover in 
denying the claim is not an issue, making Bowler 
distinguishable, and its requirements do not apply to 
the defendant's denial letter. W I ]  
FN1. PlainWs brief, on page 23, does 
assert that "The defendant's conduct 
clearly breached the principles of good 
faith and fair dedmg required of insurance 
companies in this State[.]" However, the 
only proof'the plaintiffs offer to show bad 
faith is the fact that defendant did not 
follow the Bowler requirements. This is a 
circular argument, since the Bowler 
requirements are clearly limited to 
situations where the insurance company 
knows or should know that plaintiff will 
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prevail if a suit is initiated. If the Bowler 
requirements do not apply, then failing to 
follow them is hardly a per se showing of 
bad faith. 
[4] During the motion hearing, the motion judge 
stated that: 
Plaintiff argues that the defendant did not outright 
reject or deny their claim. I think the ... language 
of the letter is unequivocal and clearly 
demonstrates a denial. 
It is on this ruling that we part company with the 
motion judge. We fad  that the letter is ambiguous. 
The letter of September 1995 contained the 
following passage: 
Since Coverage C--Personal Property is named 
peril and there are no perils which include the 
bursting of a waterbed, we will be unable to 
provide coverage for this portion of the claim. 
In specifying these grounds for denial, we do not 
intend to waive, but rather specifically reserve all 
our rights under the contract of insurance 
including, but not limited to, other defenses 
which may be applicable to your claim. 
Additionally, we continue to require full and 
complete compliance with all terms and 
conditions of the policy. 
If yoi~ have any questions or further information 
which may become pertinent, please contact us so 
that we may consider it. 
Should you wish to take this matter up with the 
New Jersey State Insurance Department, you can 
write them at State of New Jersey Department of 
Insurance, Division of Enforcement and 
Consumer Protection, CN329, Trenton, New 
Jersey 08625-0329. 
First, the letter is ambiguous because it refers to the 
submission of new information. One might 
reasonably wonder why Hanover would request 
more information, if coverage bas already *642 
been unequivocally denied due to its definition of 
'%ousebold appliance." A very rational conclusion 
would be that the denial is not, in fact, final, but 
instead represents a preliminary finding that 
remains open to revision. A California case 
supports this very interpretation. In **I101 
Prudential-LMI Comm. Im. v. Superior Court, 5 1 
CaL3d 674, 274 CaLRptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 
(1990), the Califomia Supreme Court was faced 
with a situation very similar to the one at hand, 
where it bad to determine how long the suit 
limitation period on a properiy insurance policy 
should be tolled. In that case, the insured plaintiffs 
bad received a letter &om the insurer "proposing 
that coverage would be denied based on the ... 
exclusion unless the insureds bad any additional 
information that would favor coverage." Id. at 692, 
274 CaLRptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230. This letter 
began a series of negotiations between the insured 
and insurer, finally resulting in a formal and 
unequivocal denial some months later. The 
California Supreme Court elected to toll the running 
of the limitation period until the unequivocal denial, 
and not the denial that invited the submission of 
more information. Id at 693, 274 CaLRptr. 387, 
798 P.2d 1230. 
Second, the letter also suggests that if the Azzes are 
uohappy about the decision, they should contact the 
Department of Insurance POI). This language 
could reasonably lead a person to conclude that 
contact with DO1 was actually a prerequisite to a 
lawsuit. Simiily, it could also lead the insured to 
believe such a contact would result in the resolution 
of the claim, so as to render a lawsuit unnecessary. 
The suggestion by the insurer that the insured 
contact DO1 gives the distinct impression that the 
insurer's denial might in some way be influenced by 
DOI, contributing to the general equivocality of the 
denial. 
Third, the denial letter is not sufficiently 
unequivocal, because of the special circumstances 
that surrounded the claim in this case. Here, the 
Azzes were dealing with Hanover on two separate 
claims. At the time that the denial letter regarding 
the personal property claim under Coverage "C," 
was sent, the Azzes were concurrently dealing with 
Hanover on payment of the Coverage *643 "A" 
structural damage claim, which stemmed &om the 
same waterbed incident. In fact, the record sbows 
that the Azzes' delay in addressing their personal 
property claim might well have resulted &om their 
attempts to repair their home and obtain 
reimbursement from Hanover. Clearly, the record 
sbows that the parties were engaged in negotiations 
regarding the structural damage claim well into 
1996. Because both claims stemmed &om the 
same homeowner's policy, and because negotiations 
regarding a section of that claim were ongoing well 
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after the September 1995 denial letter, a reasonable 
insured might well believe that the limitations 
period would not restart until afier the struckma1 
damage claim was settied. 
We conclude for the above reasons that the 
September 1995 letter was not an unequivocal 
denial, and that the tolling of the limitations period 
begun in August 1995 thus did not stop until 
January 1997. Accordingly, the present action was 
timely filed. 
[5] Hanover also denied coverage for the personal 
property portion of the claim, asserting that a 
waterbed was not a household appliance, and that 
therefore the accident was not covered. The 
motion judge determined that a waterbed should be 
considered a "household appliance" for purposes of 
the policy. Hanover argues on cross-appeal that 
the motion judge erred in that fmding. 
Hanover begins its argument by stating that there is 
no case law in New Jersey that defines the term 
"household appliance." But in Stone v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 211 N.J.Super. 246, 249, 511 A.2d 717 
(App.Aiv.1986) we held that "An appliance is a 
tool, instrument or device adapted for a particular 
use [.I" Stone then applies this definition of 
"appliance" as though it also defines "household 
appliance." Therefore, we define "household 
appliance" as a tool, instrument or device adapted 
for a particular use in a house. Bid. The device in 
*"I102 Stone was a hose connecting a sump pump 
to a draiin in the basement. 
*644 Generic description of "household appliance" 
aside, the fact is that the Hanover policy does not 
defme a "household appliance." The failure to 
define a term in a policy of insurance has been 
construed to render it ambiguous. In Property Cas. 
Co. of MCA v. Conway. 147 N.J. 322, 326, 687 A. 
2d 729 (1997) the C o w  stated: 
One of the most basic precepts governing judicial 
construction of insurance policies is that courts 
construe ambiguities liberally in favor of the 
insured. Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 
530, 537, 582 A.2d 1257 (1990). Insurers write 
the policies, and fairness suggests that insureds 
should receive the benefit of any ambiguities. 
By failing to define "accident," PCC has 
introduced ambiguity into the defmition of 
"occurrence." Consequently, in defining 
"accident" and "occurrence" we shall construe 
any ambiguity against the insurer and in favor of 
the insured. 
161 Furthermore, insurance contracts are contracts 
of adhesion, and therefore subject to liberal 
constnrction so as to benefit the insured. Meier v. 
New Jersty Life Ins. Co., 101 N.J. 597, 61 1, 503 A. 
2d 862 (1986). The question, therefore, is whether, 
using the standard of liberal consmction, an 
electrically-heated waterbed could reasonably be 
considered a tool, instrument or device adapted for 
a particular purpose. We concur with the motion 
judge that it can, for the reasons that follow. 
Defendants rest a large portion of their argument 
on a Florida case, West American Ins. Co. v. 
Lowrie, 600 So.2d 34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992), 
which asserts that a waterbed is furniture, and not 
an appliance. We are, of course, not bound by the 
decisions of Florida courts, and our law suggests 
that we should treat this particular waterbed 
otherwise. 
First, a waterbed in New Jersey could be both 
furniture and a household appliance. We have 
noted that Stone v. Royal Ins. Co., 2 I1 N.JSuper. 
246, 249, 511 A.2d 717 (App.Div.1986) dealt with 
the question of whether a sump pump could be 
considered a "household appliance" for purposes of 
insurance coverage. The issue in this case was 
whether the pump was, in fact, a " f m e . "  The 
court clearly held that " 'appliance' and ' f~ ture '  are 
not mutually exclusive terms. An appliance ... can 
be a fixture." Id at 249, 511 A.2d 717. If a f w e  
can also be an appliance, then "645 there is no 
reason that something ordinarily considered 
furniture cannot also be an appliance. 
Second, waterbeds, l i e  the one involved here, are 
generally purchased with beating units which plug 
into the household electric current like washing 
machines and dishwashers, appliances which also 
contain water. They provide warmth as well as 
support. We draw an analogy to an electric 
blanket. Few people would consider a regular 
blanket to be an appliance. However, once one 
modifies a blanket so that it also provides heat 
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electrically, this new item, an "electric blanket," 
suddenly takes on the characteristics of a household 
appliance. Note the certainty in the tone of the 
U.S. District Court in Remington Rand Inc. v. 
Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F.Supp. 613, 622 
(E.D.Pa.1956), when it proclaims that "A 
nonexhaustive list of appliances are: Electric 
blankets, blenders, vacuum type coffee makers, hair 
dryers, fans, deep fat fryers, frypans, hand irons, 
food mixers, .heating pads, corn poppers, 
vaporizers, massage vibrators, waffle irons and 
electric razors." We fmd that if a blanket becomes 
an appliance once it provides heat, so too does a 
waierbed. 
For the reasons stated we hold that a "household 
appliance" includes an electrically-heated waterbed. 
Reversed in parf a f f i i ed  in part and remanded to 
the trial court. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
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names are unknown, 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER DENYING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Douglas S. Marfice, Coeur d'Alene, for Plaintiffs. 
Patrick E. Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for Defendants. 
1. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 2, 2003, Plaintiffs Brian and Glenda Armstrong's, above-ground 
swimming pool collapsed, causing approximately 2,000 gallons of water to flood the 
Plaintiffs' 1500 square foot finished basement. No one was present when the collapse 
occurred. At the time of the pool collapse, Plaintiffs carried a homeowner's insurance 
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policy with Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho (hereinafter Farmers). Plaintiffs notified 
Farmers of their loss, but Farmers denied the Plaintiffs' claim in three letters dated 
September 17, October 2, and November 14,2003. 
On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action, alleging 
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent 
investigation and claim adjustment, and unfair trade practices. In their prayer for relief, 
Plaintiffs sought the policy benefits of their insurance contract, special and general 
damages, and attorney fees and costs. On January 5, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a notice of 
hearing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a memorandum in support of 
their motion. However, Plaintiffs did not file their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
until January 20, 2005. Over the Defendants' objection, a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion 
was held on February 1,2005. 
. In the~r summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment of 
coverage under their homeowner's policy with Farmers. The Plaintiffs first contend that 
the release of water from their pool constitutes a "sudden and accidental discharge" of 
water from a "household appliance," which is a peril expressly covered by their insurance 
policy. The Plaintiffs argue that the phrase "household appliance" is unambiguous and 
includes an above-ground swimming pool within its meaning. The Plaintiffs alternatively 
argue that, if the phrase "household appliance" is ambiguous, the rules of construction 
nevertheless require all ambiguities to be resolved against the insurer in this instance. 
In response, the Defendants contend that the Court may not grant the Plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment, because the Plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory 
judgment, a cause of action not pleaded in their Complaint. The Defendants next assert 
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that the Plaintiffs' loss is attributable to water damage, as that phrase is defined in the 
policy, and is therefore a loss expressly excluded firom coverage. The Defendants further 
argue that, because an above-ground swimming pool is not within the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the phrase "household appliance," the escape of water from the Plaintiffs' 
pool is not a "sudden and accidental discharge" of water from a "household appliance" 
that would otherwise be covered under the policy. Like the Plaintiffs, the Defendants 
claim that the Plaintiffs' insurance policy is unambiguous. However, the Defendants 
assert that the term "household appliance" unambiguously exclt~des from within its 
meaning an above-ground swimming pool, rather than includes it. 
The relevant portions of the Plaintiffs' insurance contract with Farmers are as 
follows: 
[SECTION I-] LOSSES INSURED 
Coverage A - Dwelling 
. Coverage B -Separate Structures 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in 
Coverage A and B, except as provided in Section I -Losses Not Insured, 
Coverage C -Personal Property 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in 
Coverage C, but only if caused by one or more of the following perils: . . . 
13. Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam from 
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from within 
a household appliance, but not for. . . . 
(Policy at 7-8.) 
SECTION I -LOSSES NOT INSURED 
Applying to Coverage A and B - Dwelling and Separate Structures 
and Coverage C -Personal Property 
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or caused directly or 
indirectly by: . . . 
2. Water damage. 
. . . Whenever water damage occurs, the resulting loss is always 
excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover: . . . 
2. loss or damage to the interior of any dwelling, mobile home or 
separate structures, or to personal property inside the dwelling, 
173 
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mobile home or separate structures caused by water damage if the 
property inside the dwelling, mobile home or separate structures 
first sustain loss or damage caused by a peril described under 
Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage C. 
(Policy at 9 and Policy Endorsement H6104.) Water damage is defined within the policy 
as: 
. . . loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any of 
the following, whether occumng on or away from the residence premises: 
a. Water from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, 
overflow or escape of a body of water. . . . 
(Policy at 4 (emphasis omitted).) 
11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). "Generally, when considering a 
motion for summary judgment, a court 'liberally construes the record in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and 
concl~rsions in that party's favor."' Drew v. Sorensen 133 Idaho 534, 989 P.2d 276 (1999) 
(citing Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576,944 P.2d 709, 71 l(1997)). 
111. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Coverage for Some of the Loss Claimed bv the Plaintiffs is Expressly 
Excluded from the Plaintiffs' Insurance Policv. Because the Claimed Loss 
is the Result of "Water Damage" as Defined Within the Policv. 
Plaintiffs claim that the loss they have suffered due to the sudden discharge of 
water from their swimming pool is not a loss expressly excluded from coverage under 
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their homeowner's insurance policy, because their loss was not caused by "water 
damage," as that phrase is defined within the policy. The Defendants disagree, arguing 
that the type of loss claimed by the Plaintiffs can be called nothing but "water damage," 
as the source of the loss was, in fact, a large spill of water from a swimming pool that 
then flooded the Plaintiffs' basement. The Plaintiffs' policy defines water damage in 
relevant as "loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by . . . 
[wlater from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, [or an] overflow or 
escape of a body of water." (Policy at 4 (emphasis omitted).) The parties seem to 
concede that the only portion of this definition that is at issue is the part pertaining to an 
"overflow or escape of a body of water." Thus, before the Court is able to determine 
whether or not the Plaintiffs' loss constitutes water damage, the Court must first 
determine whether or not the phrase "body of water" is ambiguous, Clark v. 
Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540,66 P.3d 242,244 (2003), an issue 
not briefed by the parties, but one that nevertheless requires resolution. 
When interpreting insurance policies, the Court is to apply the general rules of 
contract law, subject to certain special canons of construction, w, 138 Idaho at 540, 
66 P.3d at 244 (citing Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227, 
1233 (1988)). The first step is to determine whether or not the policy contains an 
ambiguity. Id. A provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 597, 990 P.2d 
1204, 1208 (1999). Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must 
be determined, as a matter of law, according to the plain meaning of the words used. 
m, at 541, 66 P.3d at 245 (citing Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 
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232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996)). However, where an ambiguity exists, the trier of 
fact must determine what a reasonable person would have understood the language to 
mean. Id.; Mocabv, at 597,990 P.2d at 1208. 
Idaho courts have not expressly defined the phrase "body of water" outside the 
context of a "navigable" body of water. See, gg., Selkirk-Priest Basin.AssYn, Inc. v. 
State es rel. Andn~s, 127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995) (discussing whether or not 
I 
Trapper Creek constituted a navigable body of water for purposes of applying the public 
I trust doctrine); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 
I 
1 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983)(recognizing Lake Coeur d',Alene's status as a navigable lake). ! 
i Neither is the phrase defined in Black's Law Dictionary. The courts have, however, used 
I the phrase when discussing lakes, rivers, creeks, and ponds. See, e.&, Selkirk-Priest 
I 
I 
I Basin Ass'n, Inc.; Pandandle Yacht Club, Inc.; Rutledge v. State, 94 Idaho 121, 482 P.2d 
j 515 (1981) (discussing the Boise River); Bicandi v. Boise Pavette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 
I 
543, 44 P.2d 1103 (1935) (refemng to "ponds, pools, and other bodies of water" when 
discussing whether or not a millpond constituted an attractive nuisance). They have also 
used the phrase where the water at issue was collected by way of a man-made dam or 
artificial enclosure. a, G, Stott By and Throu~h Dougall v. Finnev, 130 Idaho 894, 
950 P.2d 709 (1997) (holding that negligence is the proper theory of recovery in tort for 
damages due to a "discharge from an artificial body of water"). 
The courts' usage of the phrase "body of water" clearly indicates that it is used to 
describe some determinable amount of water, standing or flowing, that is somehow 
I 
I enclosed, contained or bounded. In fact, "body" is defined in relevant part as a "bounded 
I 
aggregate of matter <a body of water>." WEBSTER'S U NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY I24 
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(1995). Moreover, even without citation to case precedent, one is able to reasonably 
conclude from the common usage of the phrase that it generally refers to quantifiable 
amounts of water. Consequently, as there can be no reasonable conflicting interpretations 
of the phrase, the phrase is not ambiguous. 
While the parties would not liltely dispute whether or not lakes and rivers and the 
like are bodies of water - perhaps the parties would even agree that the phrase is 
unambiguotis - the real question in the present case is whether or not a swimming pool 
also constitutes a body of water, according to the plain meaning of the phrase "body of 
water," as discussed above. A pool is defined in relevant part as: "1.a. A small body of 
still water. . . . 3. A deep place in a river or stream. 4. A swimming pool." WEBSTER'S I1 
NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 124 (1995). Thus, it i s  clear that a swimming pool is no less 
a "body of water" than a small lake or pond. 
. Since the phrase "body of water" is unambiguous and plainly includes swimming 
pools within its meaning, the escape or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' swimming 
pool constitutes "water damage" as defined by the Plaintiffs' insurance policy and is 
excluded from coverage. Unless one of the policy's exceptions to this exclusion applies, 
the Plaintiffs have not shown that, as a matter of law, they are entitled to insurance 
benefits for the damage caused to their dwelling as a result of the collapse of their 
swimming pool. 
B. Because the Plaintiffs' Swimming Pool is Not a "Household A~pliance," 
the Plaintiffs' Insurance Policy Does Not Othenvise Provide Coverase for 
the Remaining Loss Claimed bv the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs argue first that, even if the loss they claim was caused by water damage, 
the policy nevertheless provides coverage for their loss due to an exception to the water 
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damage exclusion and a related provision under Section I - Losses Iilsured - Coverage C 
- Personal Property, which provides coverage for loss that results From a sudden 
discharge of water from within a household appliance. The Plaintiffs assert that the ten11 
"household appliance" unambiguoi~sly includes within its meaning a swimming pool 
such as the one the Plaintiffs own. Aitematively, Plaintiffs argue thal, if tlie term 
"household appliance" is ambiguous, a reasonable person would understand it to include 
within its meaning an above-ground swimming pool, so their policy would provide 
coverage for the loss they claim. Conversely, the Defendants argue that tlre term 
"household appliance" unambiguously excludes from within its meaning swimmiiig 
pools, thereby making the exception to the water damage exclusion and the related 
provision in Coverage C inapplicable. If not, the Defendant argues that the term then is 
ambiguous and a reasonable person would nevertheless understand it as describing things 
or objects other than swimming pools. 
The Plaintiffs' policy provides three express exceptions to its water damage 
exclusion discussed above. (Policy at 9 and Endorsement H6104.) The only one relevant 
is the one providing coverage for "loss or damage to the interior of any dwelling, . . . or 
to personal property inside the dwelling, . . . caused by water damage if the dwelling . . . 
first sustained loss or damage caused by a peril described under Section I - Losses 
Insured - Coverage C." (Endorsement H6104.) The only peril that could encompass the 
pool collapse or overflow at issue in the present case is found in paragraph 13 of Section 
1 - Losses Insured - Coverage C: "[sludden or accidental discharge or overflow of water 
or steam from within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from within a 
household appliance." (Policy at 8.) The parties do not dispute that the pool may not be 
considered part of a plumbing, heating, or air conditioning system. 
As above, the Court must first determine if the term "household appliance" is 
ambiguous. Clark v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540, 66 P.3d 
242, 244; Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227, 1233. The 
Ida110 Supreme Court has previously held that the term "household" is not ai~lbiguous. 
See Mutual of Enumclaw Lns. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,235-36, 912 P.2d 119, 122- -
23 (1996). The adjective "household" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as 
"[b]elonging to the house and family; domestic." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 744 (7th ed. 
Both parties offer various dictionary definitions for the term "appliance." An 
appliance is defined, in turn, as: 1) refemng to "machinery and all instruments used in 
operating it. . . . Things applied to or used as a means to an end. . . . a mechanical thing, a 
device or apparatus;"' 2) a "device, esp. one operated by electricity and designed for 
household use"' 3) a "device or instrument designed to perform a specific function, 
especially an electrical device, such as a toaster, for household use;"' and 4) an 
"instn~ment or device designed for a particular use."4 In addition, the Plaintiffs cite to 
Idaho's Property Condition Disclosure Act, which requires a seller of residential real 
property to disclose "[all1 appliances and service systems included in the sale (such as 
refngeratorlfreezer, rangeloven, dishwasher, . . . pooVhot tub, etc.)," as evidence that, as 
' Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 15 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (revised 4"' ed. 
A). 
WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 55 (1995). 
Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 2l(citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4"' ed. 2000), available at http:l/www.bartleby.com~61199/A0379900.htm1. 
' Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support at 7 (citing WEBSTER'S 9" COLLEGIATE D~CT~ONARY 
(1985)). 
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a matter of law, Idaho considers a pool to be an appliance. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support at 7 (citing Idaho Code 5 55-2508).) 
While the Plaintiffs' argument is certainly creative and indicative of resoifrceft~l 
and inventive legal skills, the Court nevertheless finds that the term "ho~~sehold 
appliance" is neither ambiguous, nor commonly understood to include the Plaintiffs' 
above-ground swimming pool within its meaning. There has been no evidence presented 
to the Court that the Plaintiffs' pool was somehow operated by electricity. Nor is a 
swimming pool generally considered a mechanical means to an end. As a result, the 
discharge or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' pool is not a discharge or overflovv 
from a household appliance, which means that the policy exception to the water damage 
exclusion does not apply, and Farmers is not obligated, on these facts, to compensate the 
Plaintiffs for their claimed loss to their dwelling. 
, As the "household appliance" language is also used in a provision relating to 
coverage for loss of personal property, the Court's finding also means that a peril 
necessary to invoke coverage for loss to the Plaintiffs' personal property has not 
occurred, and Farmers is not obligated to compensate the Plaintiffs for their claimed loss 
of personal property. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is 
denied. Although the Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment in their motion for partial 
summary judgment without having pleaded such a cause of action in their Complaint, the 
Court sees no reason to treat the Plaintiffs' motion differently than any other motion for 
partial summary judgment. It is an essential element of at least the Plaintiffs' breach of 
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contract cause of action that Fanners had a duty under the Plaintiffs' policy to cover the 
losses claimed by the Plaintiffs. In seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue of 
coverage under the policy, the Plaintiffs were effectively seeking a partial summary 
judgment on the issue of this alleged duty. Moreover, the Court's decision denying 
Plaintiffs' motion renders the Defendants' argument on this point moot. 
The Defendants' objection to the Court hearing the Plaintiffs' motion based on the 
Plaintiffs' failure to file their motion for summary judgment conc~lrrently with their brief 
in support is overmled, as the Defendants were given notice of the Plaintiffs' motion 
when the Plaintiffs filed their brief and both parties were given full opportunity to argue 
the substantive merits of the Plaintiffs' motion before the Court. It is presumed that the 
Defendants had ample time to prepare for the scheduled hearing, as they did not request a 
continuance. As a result, especially in light of the Court's ruling on the Plaintiffs' 
mation, the Defendants have failed to show how they suffered any prejudice as a result of 
the Plaintiffs' filing mishap. 
Entered this a/ day of March, 2005 
C+q.p,p . . / 
Charles W. Hosack, District Judge 
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APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
61 8 North 4th Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur dlAlene, Idaho 838 16-1 336 
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-92 14 
ORDER TO DISQUALIFY 
ALTERNATE JUDGE 
The foregoing Motion to Disqualify Alternate Judge having duly and regularly come 
before this Court, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEPSBY CRDERED, :hat The Honorable Job T. Mitchell be disqualifiec! 
from the above-captioned matter. 
DATED this Kday of 4 (.\ ul-r, ,2007. 
I 
D strict C urt Judge u 
ORDER TO DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE - 1 185 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certiiy that on the& day of ($d+L 2007,L served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box E Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 J Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
Douglas S. Marfice - US Mail 
Ramsden & Lyons - Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1336 - Iland Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-1336 J Facsimile (208) 664-5884 
ORDER T o  DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE - 2 Ti 86 




PATRI~K E. MILLFR - ISB *I771 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Fro61 Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. B O ~  E 
Coeur d!Alenc, ID 83816-0328 
~e le~ho 'he :  (208) 664-81 15 
~acsimiie: (208) 664-6338 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 1 
ARMQRONG, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV-03-9214 
! ) 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
1 
F ~ S  INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
ID AH^, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE ) 
I DOESlI-X, whose truc names are unknown, ) 
1 
Defendants. ) , 
COMES NOW, the defendant, F m e r s  Insurance Company of Idaho, pursuant to RuIe56(b). 
I.R.C.P., and moves rhe Court, for summary judgment in behalf ol this defendant, dismissing 
plaintiffs' claims against this defendanr. 
This defendanr requests oral argument. 
0 2 / 0 2 / 2 0 0 7  1 0  5 3  F A Y  2 0 8 6 6 4 6 3 3 8  P A I N E  HHMBLEN CDA 
I 
~ A T E D  this &day of &42..&9,2.007. 
Attorney for Defendants 
! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of ,2007, I causcd to bc ~~HEREEY CERTIFY that on the & &U 
served aitrue and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated elow, and addressed co 
the follo i n g  P . 
I 
Douglas S. Marfice 
$icichael A. Ealy 
fCnrnsden & Lyons 
d l8  North 4" Street 
I?. 0. Box 1336 
&cur d7Alene, ID 83816-1336 
I 
& U.S. MAIL 
HAND D E L M R E D  
OVERNIGHTMAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884 
I 
NT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
2 / ~ 2 / 2 0 U I  TO 53 F A X  203fifi46333 PAINE H H M B L E N  C D A  @OOS/OlO 
K E. W R  - TSB #I771 
Avenue, Suite 101 
ID 838 16-0328 
s:b,.:~ ;,,?:! # ~ . .  . 
.~;AY!, , Co'ik jf OK Q ~ T E ~ ~ ~ ,  1 ss 
.-;I L En. L,. 
/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST IUO1CIAL DISTRICT OF 






) Case No. CV-03-9214 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 







dOMES NOW. the defendant, Fanoerr Insurance Company of Idaho, pursuant to ththc 
I 
Idaho R les of Civil Procedure and the mles of this Court, and submits this memorandum of i 
omenr. thorities and srgument in support of this defendant's motion for summary jud, 
NDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOT10 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 """? 




1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
diuintiffs, hy their complaint, asserted that they had purchased a policy of insurance from 
Defenda t: that an ahove ground pool at their residence had collapsed; that defendant denied ihe I 
claim b stating thar there was no coverage for the claims. 
laintiffs asserted that defendant's denial constituted a breach of contract, a breach of a good lai and fair dealing, ncgfigcnt investigation and claim adjustment, and unfair trade 
as wcll as fraud. 
laindffs have generally argued in this matter that these constitute u claim of "bad faith". 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
reviously, the plaintiffs moved for panial summary judgment asserting that the language 
provided coverage of the claim. 
is Court issued its Memorandum Decision on March 21,2005 and by that 
decision, construed the policy, according to its language. and determined thar rhere 
for the claimed loss. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
si ummary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, 
together ith the affidavits, if any, show rhar there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and E. 
that the oving party is entitled to jud,ment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), LR.C.P. I 
/02/2007 10 53 F A X  2086646338 PAINE H$,MBLEN CDA ~ O O i / O l o  
I 
RAGE OF THE CLAIM, PURSUANT TO TWE PQLlCY LANGUAGE, IS AN 
ESS~NTIAL REQUZREMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS TO ASSERT CLAMS ARISING 
OUT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, OR BAD FAITH. 
I 
t his Court has previously addrcssed the question of coverage, as asserted by ihe 
plaintiff . This Court, by its Memorandum Decision, found [hat there was no coverage for the i 
evencs hich led then to the plaintiffs' claimed loss. 4 
I Robinson v. State Farm Mu~ual Automobile Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 45 P.3d 829 i 
(S.Ct. 2 02), the court addressed the question of coverage as an element of a claim of bad faith. i 
4he court noted bar a plaintiff can bring one of two types of bad faith claims, 
I 
unreaso able denial or unreasonable delay. The court then stated: t 
there m st be coverage of the claim under the policy. Therefore, wjlhout coverage, there cannot i 
Robinson 
tion of duties by an insurance carrier, which leads to any variation of a claim asserred as 
However, the coverage a plaintiff will have to provc in order to 
establish a prima facie case is not dependent on rhe nature of the 
bad faith claim. 
v. State F m  Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra at p. 178. 
I'he court then held that fundamental LO the claim of bad faith is the requirement that 
"bad fa$". 
i oreover, in Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., rapra, the court also 
held tha , in order to recover for breach of contract claims, there must be coverage under the 1 
policy. 




+his defendant submits that the marter is straightforward. Without coverage, there cannot 
I 
i 
be a bash for the plaintiffs' claims. Without coverage, as the court in Robinson noted, the 
plaintiff ciinnot establish a prima facic claim asserted us breach of contract, or bad faith, in m y  
variatio of the language of those claims. I 
*his defendant submits that without coverage, the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed 
l 
and thatlthis court grant this defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
2@by of ATED this - 
PATRICK E. 6lILLER 
Attorney for Dcfcndants 
I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
k d I .HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of ,2007, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated %elow, and addressed to the foll ing: 
ouglas S. Mwfice 
ichael A. Ealy 
amsden & Lyons 
18 Nonh 4"' Street 
. 0. Box 1336 




TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884 
MEMO A&DUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
I 
MOT10 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
I 4 I 
1;,47 
,t' DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
< APRIL M. LEVSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
61 8 North 4'" Street 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Aiene, Idaho 8381 6-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-581 8 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
STATE OF iCAN0 
~:OUHTY OF HODTEN;~, )SS 
e t ! - ~ ; i .  
Attorneys for Plalntlffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OFIDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-92 14 
MEMORANDUM UV RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANTS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, Brian and Glenda Armstrong ("Armstrongs"), and submit 
this Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Armstrongs incorporate by reference the briefing, proof and argument previously 
submitted in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (Argued February I ,  2005). In 
response to that blotion the Court addressed the question of insurance coverage and ruled as 
a matter of law that there was no coverage for the events and circumstances which lead to the 
Armstrongs' loss. 
1 9 5  
- - ------,"c rn nFFFNnANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
Almstrongs acknowledge that the Court's ruling on their summary judgment was, for 
all intents and purposes, dispositive of their claims including the claim of bad faith, 
unreasonable denial and  inr reasonable delay in the adjustment of insurance claims. 
Armstrongs assert that the District Court was in error in its interpretation of the 
subject policy, however, and intend to take an appeal once the Court's Order is deemed final. 
To the extent the District Court did not intend its Order on Annstrongs sumnary judgment 
motion to be dispositive of their claims, the Order nevertheless appears to be so. 
DATED this &%ay of February, 2007 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
5*& BY =k? 
~ o u a d s  S. M a r f i c d ~ f  the Firm 
~ t t o k e y s  for plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the - /d%y of February 2007, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. - y/GS Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 - Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Aiene, ID 83816-0328 Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
'5- fly 
Douglas S. Marfice 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TElE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CRLAN AR31STRONG and GLENDPL ) 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV-03-9214 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT 
) FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
vs . ) OF IDAHO 
1 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE ) 
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown, ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
On March 27, 2007, this matter came before the court pursuant to the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment, and the court having considered its March 21,2005 memorandum opinion 
and order, including the Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, as stated therein, and the briefs 
and arguments of the parties which are hereby incorporated by reference, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be, 
and is, entered in favor of the defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, and that plaintiffs 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 1 
Brian Armstrong and Glenda Armstrong, husband and wife, shall have and recover nothing against 
the defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho in this action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant shall recover 
,A$ N e r ~ a r , ~ d  fin 3 C;UC~'C w7 
from the plaintiffs the sum of , as costs and disbursements. 
DATED this day of d ,2007 
District Judge 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), X.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no 
just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct 
that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an 
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
/ ~ l i f - ( , ~ z c c k ' ~  *#? Lo 
A f r ~ d  ,'-A J 59&) bY4ffl' /' 
CHARLES W. HOSACK, District Judge 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 2 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of :b r y ' u  h ,2007,I caused 
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the dethod indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons 
618 N. 4" Street 
P. 0 .  Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
U.S. MAIL - 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884 
Patrick E. Miller 
Attorney at Law 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83816-0328 
0 U.S. Mail . -
'3 TELECOPY (FAX) to: (208) 664-6338 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT CO 
By: 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 3 
.fii$K GF /s.$Ha 
;BV,IT y OF. K O O T E N A I ) ~ ~  ~ 
; . k t  y:: .. , .. 
DOUGLAS S: MARFICE, ISB #4072 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
7 L I CaOq,3 
2N7 BAY 24 2: 43 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
Attorneys for PlaintiffsIAppellant 
61 8 North 4"' Street 
Post Office Box I336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
VS. . 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are i~nknown, 
DefendantsiRespondents. 
Case No. CV 03-92 14 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: T 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTSmESPOADENTS, FARMERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; 
CORPORATE DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown 
AND TO: THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ATTORNEYS, Patrick E. 
Miller of the firm Paine Hanibian, LLP, 701 Front Avenue, Suite 101, 
Post Office Box E, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328. 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NnTTPF nF APPFAT . 1 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. . The above named PlaintiffsiAppellants, Brian and Glenda Armstrong appeal 
against the above named DefendantsRespondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Judgment for Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, entered in the above-entitled 
action on the 12"' day of April, 2007, Honorable Judge Charles W. Hosack presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a) I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal. 
(A) Whether the escape or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' swimming 
pool constitutes "water damage" as defined by the Plaintiffs' insurance 
policy and is excluded from coverage of real and personal property. 
(B) Whether the Plaintiffs' insurance policy provides coverage for their loss 
due to an exception to the water damage exclusion. 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the. 
following portions of the reporter's transcript: Transcripts of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment February 1, 2005 at 3:30 p.m.; and Transcripts of Hearing on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment March 27,2007. 
5. The PlaintiffiAppellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
(b) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
(c) Submission of Materials in Support of Defendant Farmers Insurance 
Company of Idaho's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
(d) Defendant Fanners Insurance Company of Idaho's Brief in Opposition 
To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(e) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(0 Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Filing of "Motion" 
(g) Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice in Support of Ex Parte Motion to 
Shorten Time 
(h) Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice 
(i) Reply to Defendant's Motion in Opposition To Partial Summary 
Judgment 
(j) Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(k) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(1) Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
6. No order has been entered in this matter sealing all or any part of the record or 
transcript. 
7. I certify: 
(a) Thata copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) That arrangements have been made to pay the Clerk of the District the estimated 
fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript; (I.A.R. 24@), LC. 4 1-1 105) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
( )  That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this & day of May, 2007. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e a d a y  of May 2007, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. US Mail 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 & Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box E - Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 - Facsimile (208) 664-6338 
Joann Schaller Z U S  Mail 
Kootenai County District Court - Overnight Mail 
501 Government Way Hand Delivered 
PO Box 9000 - Facsimile (208) 446- 1 138 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-900 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; 
CORPORATE DOES I-X, whose true 
names are unknown, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
34250 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is 
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that exhibits were not offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the 
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, 
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the f 3 day of 
S-PAQ+ ,2007. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Kootenai County, Idaho this 1 G\ day Seir>-8- ,2007. 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 




IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; 
CORPORATE DOES I-X, whose true 
names are unknown, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
34250 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
Douglas S Marfice Patrick E Miller, Esq. 
PO Box 1336 PO Box E 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336 Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 1 day of ?,-,+ ,2007. 
Daniel J. English 
